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Practical reasoning (PR), which is concerned with the generic question of what to do, is
generally seen as a two steps process: (1) deliberation, in which an agent decides what state
of affairs it wants to reach – that is, its desires; and (2) means-ends reasoning, in which the
agent looks for plans for achieving these desires. The agent’s intentions are a consistent set
of desires that are achievable together.
This paper proposes the first argumentation system for PR that computes in one step
the possible intentions of an agent, avoiding thus the drawbacks of the existing systems.
The proposed system is grounded on a recent work on constrained argumentation systems,
and satisfies the rationality postulates identified in argumentation literature, namely the
consistency and the completeness of the results.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Practical reasoning (PR) [2] is concernedwith the generic question of what to do for a rational agent in a given situation. In
his seminal book [3], Wooldridge defines PR as a two step process. The first step, called deliberation, consists of identifying
the states of affairs an agent wants to reach (i.e. the desires). This step is decomposed into two distinct components: (i) an
option generation component in which the agent generates a set of possible desires, and (ii) a filtering component in which
the agent chooses between competing desires. In the second step of PR, called means-end reasoning, the agent looks for
plans for reaching the chosen desires. If such plans exist, those desires will be called intentions and the agent commits to
achieving them. Thus, an intention is a desire that is justified and feasible. In [4], it has been argued that generating options
is an inference problem, while filtering those options is a decision making one. Regarding the means-end-reasoning step,
the authors argue that it involves two problems: an inference problem in which an agent checks the feasibility of sets of
plans, and a decision making problem in which the agent chooses among several feasible plans, the exact ones to carry
out. The authors have then proposed another decomposition of a PR process as follows: (i) option generation, (ii) checking
the feasibility of the options, i.e. to find sets of plans that are compatible in the sense that they are achievable together,
and (iii) filtering the options as well as the plans. The two decision problems are thus combined in a unique step. The new
decomposition offers at least two advantages: First, it avoids that the filtering component selects an option for which no
plan can be formed, and in so doing might exclude an option which could be carried out. The second advantage consists of
the link that exists between the two decision problems. In [4], the authors have proposed different principles for choosing
among competing and feasible options. For instance, an agent may choose a desire that has more plans for achieving it.
It is clear that such a decision principle can only be applied after the means-end-principle. In this paper, we follow this
decomposition of PR process.
< This paper extensively develops and extends the content of the conference paper [1]. The language of representation is refined andmore results on the system
are proposed.∗ Corresponding author.
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Besides, what is worth noticing in most works on practical reasoning is the use of arguments for providing reasons for
choosing or discarding a desire as an intention. These works can be divided into two groups: works that are interested
in identifying argument schemes that are used in PR (e.g. [5,6]), and works that propose concrete argumentation-based
systems for PR (e.g. [4,7–10]) following the process proposed in [4]. Recall that an argumentation system consists mainly
of a set of conflicting arguments, and the crucial issue is the selection of acceptable sets of arguments. Works of the second
category suffer from three main drawbacks.
The first problem is that the properties of the systems are not investigated; it is thus unclear whether the results of
these systems are intuitive.
The second one concerns the use of a skeptical acceptability semantics, namely grounded semantics, for evaluating
arguments. However, skeptical semantics are not suitable in practical reasoning as illustrated by the following
example of an agent who has three equally preferred desires d1, ¬d1 and d2. Assume that d1 and ¬d1 are not
conditional while d2 depends on d1 (in [9] this is denoted by d1 ⇒ d2). According to the system proposed, for
instance, in [9], there are three arguments: δ1 (in favor of d1), δ2 (in favor of¬d1) and δ3 (in favor of d2) such that δ1
and δ2 attack each other and δ2 attacks δ3. It is clear that the grounded extension of this system is empty meaning
that no desire will be pursued by this agent even if these desires are feasible. This is clearly counter-intuitive. Now, if
a credulous semantics, like preferred semantics, is considered, then two preferred extensions are returned: {δ1, δ3}
and {δ2}meaning that this agent can either pursue the two desires d1 and d2 together, or the desire ¬d1 alone.
The third drawback of existing approaches concerns the fact that the first and second steps of PR are modeled in
terms of two separate systems. In such an approach, some desires that are not feasiblemay be accepted at the option
generation step to the detriment of other justified and feasible desires, or may prevent some justified and feasible
desires from being accepted. Let us consider again the previous example, and assume that the desire ¬d1 is more
important than the two others. However, this desire is not feasible since there is no plan for carrying it out while the
agent has two plans: π1 for achieving desire d1 and π2 for achieving d2. According to the system proposed in [9],
the argument δ2 attacks both δ1 and δ3. The grounded semantics is empty in this case as well. Let us now consider
preferred semantics. It can be checked that this system has a unique preferred extension which is the set {δ2}. The
system concludes that the set of intentions is empty. This result is not desirable since the desire ¬d1 prevents d1
and d2 from being accepted while it is itself not feasible.
This paper proposes the first argumentation system that computes the possible sets of intentions of an agent in one step.
In other words, the paper presents a system that combines option generation and checking the feasibility of options. There
are two motivations for this. The first one is optimization of resources: a unified process could be more effective, because
it does not waste resources in the attempt to select desires among a large pool of desires, which may not all turn out to
be feasible after all. The second one is completeness: a unified process would prevent selecting an unfeasible desire at the
expense of a feasible one, inwhich case the agentmay endupnot realizing that there is after all away to achieve at least some
of its desires. Moreover, the use of argumentation theory presents another advantage: the choice of each set of intentions
can be explained by the corresponding arguments.
The proposed system is grounded on a recent work on constrained argumentation systems [11]. These systems extend
the general framework proposed by Dung [12] by adding a constraint on arguments. This constraint will serve to filter the
results returned byDung’s acceptability semantics. Indeed, among all the extensions, only the ones that satisfy the constraint
are kept.
Our system takes as input (i) three categories of arguments: epistemic arguments that support beliefs, explanatory argu-
ments that show that a desire holds in the current state of the world, and instrumental arguments that show that a desire
is feasible, (ii) different conflicts among those arguments, and (iii) a particular constraint on arguments that captures the
idea that for a desire to be pursued it should be both feasible and justified. This is translated by the fact that in a given
extension each instrumental argument for a desire should be accompanied by at least one explanatory argument in favor of
that desire and each explanatory argument for a desire should be accompanied by at least one instrumental argument for
that desire. Two outputs are returned by the system: The first one is a set of extensions of arguments. Due to the constraint,
only the “interesting” ones (i.e. the ones that support desires that are both justified and feasible) are kept. The second output
is different sets of intentions. The agent should select one of them. In [4], it has been argued that this is a pure decision
making problem, and several criteria have been proposed for rank-ordering sets of intentions. The output of our system
can then be an input to those criteria. In this paper, we do not consider this step. The properties of this system are deeply
investigated. In particular, we show that the results of such a system are safe, and satisfy the rationality postulates identified
in [13], namely consistency and completeness.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls the basics of an argumentation system. Section 3 introduces an
example of practical reasoning. Section 4 presents the language used for representing the main notions (beliefs, desires
and actions). Section 5 studies the different types of arguments involved in a practical reasoning problem, and Section 6
investigates the conflicts that may exist between them. Section 7 presents the constrained argumentation system for PR.
The properties of the system are studied in Section 8. Section 9 compares our approach with existing systems of practical
reasoning. All the proofs are given in an appendix at the end of the document.
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2. Constrained argumentation systems: fundamentals
Argumentation is an established approach for reasoning with inconsistent knowledge (like clinical knowledge [14]),
based on the construction and the comparison of arguments.
An argumentation formalism is built around an underlying logical language and an associated notion of logical conse-
quence, defining the notion of argument. Argument construction is amonotonic process: new knowledge cannot rule out an
argument but only gives rise to new argumentswhichmay interact with the first argument. Since knowledge basesmay give
rise to inconsistent conclusions, the arguments may be conflicting too. Consequently, it is important to determine among
all the available arguments the ones that are ultimately “acceptable”.
In [12], an abstract argumentation system is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Basic argumentation system [12]). An argumentation system is a pairAS = 〈A,R〉withA is a set of arguments,
andR is an attack relation (R ⊆ A× A). For α, β ∈ A, writing αRβ means that the argument α attacks the argument β .
In a recent study [15], this system was extended in such a way to take into account attacks on attacks. However, for the
purpose of our paper, we focus on Dung’s version of argumentation systems.
It is also worth noticing that in the previous definition, neither the origin nor the structure of arguments are specified.
Indeed, the main purpose of Dung in [12] was to propose semantics for evaluating arguments whatever their structure is.
The main semantics are based on two requirements: conflict-freeness and defence.
Definition 2 (Conflict-free, defence [12]). Let AS = 〈A,R〉 and E ⊆ A.
E is conflict-free iff α, β ∈ E s.t. αRβ .
E defends an argument α iff ∀β ∈ A, if βRα, then ∃δ ∈ E s.t. δRβ .
Different semantics were proposed in [12] and compared in [16]. For the purpose of our paper, we only need to recall
two of them: stable and preferred semantics since they are the ones that are more suitable for practical reasoning as already
explained in the introduction.
Definition 3 (Acceptability semantics [12]). Let AS = 〈A,R〉 and E ⊆ A.
E is an admissible set iff it is conflict-free and defends every element in E .
E is a preferred extension iff it is a maximal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) admissible set.
E is a stable extension iff it is a preferred extension that attacks all arguments in A\E .
Note that every stable extension is also a preferred one, but the converse is not always true.
Example 1. Let AS1 be an argumentation system such that A = {α, β, γ1, γ2, δ} and R = {(δ, γ2), (γ1, β), (γ2, β),
(β, α)}. The system AS1 is depicted in the following figure:
γ1
δ γ2 β α
It can be checked that this argumentation system has six admissible sets: E1 = ∅, E2 = {δ}, E3 = {γ1}, E4 = {δ, γ1},
E5 = {α, γ1} and E6 = {δ, γ1, α}. Among the six sets, only E6 is a preferred extension. In this example, E6 is also a stable
extension.
The basic argumentation system is extended in [11] by adding a constraint on arguments. This constraint should be
satisfied by Dung’s extensions (under a given semantics). In Example 1, one may imagine a constraint which requires that
the two arguments α and γ2 belong to the same stable extension. It is clear that this constraint can be satisfied neither by
the stable extension E6, nor by any other admissible set of the system AS1.
The constraint is a formula of a propositional language LA whose alphabet (i.e. propositional variables) is exactly the set
A of arguments. Thus, each argument in A is a literal of LA. Note that LA contains all the formulas that can be built using
the usual logical operators (∧,∨,→,¬,↔) and the constant symbols ( and⊥).
Definition 4 (Constraint, completion [11]). Let A be a set of arguments and LA its corresponding propositional language.
1366 L. Amgoud et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 1363–1391
C is a constraint on arguments of A iff C is a formula of LA.
The completion of a set E ⊆ A is Ê = {α | α ∈ E} ∪ {¬α | α ∈ A \ E}.
A set E ⊆ A satisfies C iff Ê is a model of C (̂E  C).
The completion of a set E of arguments is a set in which each argument of A appears either as a positive literal if the
argument belongs to E or as a negative one otherwise. Thus, |̂E| = |A|.
Example 1 (Continued): In the argumentation system AS1, one may want to exclude the extensions that contain both
arguments α and δ. This requirement is translated into the constraint: C = δ → ¬α. In this case, the completion of the
admissible extension E6 = {δ, γ1, α} is the set Ê6 = {δ, γ1, α,¬β,¬γ2}. Note that E6 does not satisfy C since the set Ê6 does
not infer C.
A constrained argumentation system is defined as follows:
Definition 5 (Constrained argumentation system [11]). A constrained argumentation system is a tripleCAS = 〈A,R, C〉where
A is a set of arguments,R ⊆ A× A is an attack relation and C is a constraint on arguments of the set A.
Note that, each argument may be a constraint. However, a constrained argumentation system has exactly one con-
straint. Thus, if this constraint is reduced to one argument, this means that all extensions of the system should contain this
argument.
Let us now recall how Dung’s extensions are extended to the case of constrained argumentation systems. As said
before, the idea is to compute Dung’s extensions, and to keep among those extensions only the ones that satisfy the
constraint C.
Definition 6 (C-admissible set [11]). Let CAS = 〈A,R, C〉 and E ⊆ A. The set E is C-admissible in CAS iff
(1) E is admissible,
(2) E satisfies the constraint C.1
In [12], it has been shown that the empty set is always admissible; however, it is not always C-admissible since the set ∅̂
does not always imply C.
Definition 7 (C-preferred extension, C-stable extension [11]). Let CAS = 〈A,R, C〉 and E ⊆ A.
E is a C-preferred extension of CAS iff E is maximal for set-inclusion among the C-admissible sets.
E is a C-stable extension of CAS iff E is a C-preferred extension that attacks all arguments in A\E .
Example 1 (Continued): The constrained version of AS1 is CAS1 = 〈A,R, δ → ¬α〉. The set E6 = {δ, γ1, α} is not a
C-admissible extension since its completion Ê6 = {δ, γ1, α,¬β,¬γ2} does not infer the formula δ → ¬α. However, the
admissible extensions E4 = {δ, γ1} and E5 = {α, γ1} are both C-admissible and C-preferred extensions. Note that CAS1
has no C-stable extensions.
The following result summarizes the links between the extensions of a CAS = 〈A,R, C〉 and those of its basic version
AS = 〈A,R〉.
Proposition 1 [11]. Let CAS = 〈A,R, C〉 and AS = 〈A,R〉 be its basic version.
For each C-preferred extension E of CAS, there exists a preferred extension E ′ of AS such that E ⊆ E ′.
Every C-stable extension of CAS is a stable (hence preferred) extension of AS. The converse does not hold.
Now that the acceptability semantics are defined, we are ready to define the status of any argument.
Definition 8 (Argument status). Let CAS = 〈A,R, C〉, E1, . . . , Ex its C-extensions under a given semantics, and α ∈ A.
(1) α is sceptically accepted (or accepted for short) iff α ∈ Ei, ∀Ei with i = 1, . . . , x.
(2) α is rejected iff Ei such that α ∈ Ei.
(3) α is credulouslyaccepted (orundecided) iffα isneitheracceptednor rejected. Thismeans thatα is in someextensions
and not in others.
1 Note that the constraint on arguments corresponds to a constraint on extensions.
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One can easily check that if an argument is rejected in a basic argumentation system AS under a given semantics, then
it will also be rejected in the corresponding CAS under the same semantics.
Proposition 2. Let CAS = 〈A,R, C〉 and AS = 〈A,R〉 be its basic version. For any α ∈ A, if α is rejected in AS under
semantics x (where x is either preferred or stable), then α is also rejected in CAS under the same semantics x.
Example 1 (Continued): Under preferred semantics, the arguments δ, γ1 and α are accepted while γ2 and β are rejected
in AS1. Under the same semantics, γ1 is accepted; γ2 and β are rejected; δ and α are undecided in CAS1. Finally, all the
arguments are rejected under stable semantics in CAS1, since there is no C-stable extension in CAS1.
3. Motivating example
Let us consider the case of Paula, a PhD student, who has four desires andwould like to knowwhether she can reach them
and with which plans. The four desires are:
To be in central Africa for holidays (jca).
To have her publication finished (fp).
To be a lecturer (lec).
To have visited her friend Carla (vc) if Carla is at home.
What is worth noticing is that the three first desires are unconditional, whereas the fourth one depends on whether
the friend is at home or not. Moreover, as argued in [17] a desire is a state of the world that an agent wants to reach in the
future.
In addition to desires, Paula has beliefs on the way of moving from a state of the world to another one, namely:
In order to have the paper finished, Paula should work (w).
In order to be a lecturer, Paula should defend her thesis (dt) provided that her thesis is finished (ft).
In order to visit her friend, Paula can go by car (gc) if it is in good state (gs).
In order to have tickets (t), Paula can either go to an agency (ag) or ask a friend who may bring them (afr).
In order to be vaccinated (vac), Paula can go either to a hospital (hop) or to a doctor (dr).
Paula has also some information about either the current state of the world:
Actually, Paula’s car is in good state (gs).
Carla is not at home (¬ch).
Paula’s thesis is not finished (¬ft).
Paula is not vaccinated (¬vac) and does not have her tickets (¬t).
Paula’s paper is not yet finished (¬fp).
or the consequences of some actions or some states of the world over her desires:
If Paula passes to an agency or goes to a doctor, then she cannot finish her paper.
If Paula has tickets and is vaccinated, then she can be in central Africa for holidays.
Note that the term “belief” is a generic word representing informations believed by the agent about:
the current state of the world,
the way of moving from a state of the world to another one,
the consequences of some actions or some states of the world over her desire.
The aim of this example is not to present a realistic situation, but to illustrate our ideas. Thus, it may be possible that
more information can be added either as integrity constraints or even as conditional desires.
From the above information, it is clear that the desire of becoming a lecturer is not yet feasible. The desire of visiting
Carla is feasible since there is a plan for reaching it; however, according to the current state of the world, this desire is not
justified. Indeed, for Paula to consider this desire, she should be in a state where Carla is at home and this is not the case.
Regarding the two first desires (i.e. jca and fp) things are different. Both desires are justified and feasible. However, in some
cases, it is not possible to reach both desires as their plans conflict with each other. Of course, it would be ideal if all the
desires can become intentions. As our example illustrates, this may not always be the case. In this paper we will answer the
following questions: which desires will become the intentions of the agent and with which plans?
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Next sections will give the formal material necessary for encoding this example of PR and computing the intentions of
Paula.
4. Language of representation
The example discussed in the previous section shows that three notions are involved in a PR problem: desires, actions and
beliefs. For encoding them,wewill use a setX of propositional variables (atoms). From this set, two subsets are distinguished:
Xac and Xnac with Xac ∪ Xnac = X and Xac ∩ Xnac = ∅. The subset Xac will be used for encoding actions while Xnac will be
used for encoding non-actions (i.e. beliefs and desires).
Let Lnac be a propositional language built from Xnac using the classical logical operators∧,∨,→,¬,↔ and the constant
symbols , ⊥. Note that Lnac is completely different from LA defined in Section 2.2 Lnac will be used for encoding both
desires and beliefs. As already said, a desire is a state of the world that an agent wants to reach. Thus, the main difference
between a belief and a desire is that the former is already true (or false) while the latter may only be true in the future (after
the execution of an action). In [17], it has been argued that a desire can be encoded as a preference between two states of
the world: the one in which the desire is satisfied and the one in which it is not satisfied. For instance, Paula prefers the
state in which her publication is finished to that in which it is not yet finished. In our setting, desires are distinguished from
beliefs by storing desires in a distinct set D ⊆ Lnac . Moreover, desires are literals and are denoted by d1, d2, . . .3 On their
side, beliefs are propositional formulas of the whole language Lnac .
Now regarding its source, a desire may be either unconditional or conditional. An unconditional desire does not depend
on anything, it is expressed by an agent without justification. Some desires may depend on beliefs. This is, for instance, the
case with the fourth desire of Paula. Indeed, visiting Carla depends on whether Carla is at home or not. Similarly, a desire
may depend on other desires. For example, if there is a conference in India, and I have the desire to attend, then I desire also
to attend the tutorials. In this example, the desire of attending the tutorials depends on my belief about the existence of a
conference in India, and onmy desire to attend that conference. These three sources of desires are captured by the notion of
desire rules.
Definition 9 (Desire rules). A desire rule is an expression of the form 〈b, d1, . . . , dm−1〉 ↪→ dm such that b is a propositional
formula of Lnac and each di is an element of the set D.〈b, d1, . . . , dm−1〉 is called the body of the rule and dm its consequent. Note that the body may be empty; in this case, the
desire dm is said unconditional and the desire rule is denoted by 〈〉 ↪→ dm.
The meaning of a rule 〈b, d1, . . . , dm−1〉 ↪→ dm is “if the agent believes b and desires d1, . . . , dm−1, then she will desire
dm as well”. Note that the same desire di may appear in the consequent of several rules. This means that the same desire
may depend on different beliefs or desires.
Example 2 (Paula’s example). In the motivating example, Xnac = {jca, fp, lec, vc, gs, ch, ft, vac, t}, and the set of desires is
D = {jca,¬jca, fp,¬fp, lec,¬lec, vc,¬vc}. The desire rules of Paula are 〈〉 ↪→ jca, 〈〉 ↪→ fp, 〈〉 ↪→ lec, 〈ch〉 ↪→ vc.
An agent is also equipped with a set of actions she can perform. These actions are provided by a correct and sound
planning system (for instance [18,19]) (not discussed in this paper). Note that the actions may not necessarily succeed since
the environment is changing. In what follows, an action is defined as a triple: (i) a set S of pre-conditions that should be
satisfied before executing the action,4 (ii) a set T of post-conditions that hold after executing the action, and (iii) the name
a of the action. Thus, an action allows to move from one state of the world to another. An action may either be atomic
or a conjunction of atomic actions. Thus, each action is considered as a plan for reaching a state of the world.5 Let Lac be
the propositional language built from Xac using only the classical operator ∧. Thus, formulas of Lac are either atoms or
conjunctions of atoms.
Definition 10 (Action). An action (or a plan) is a triple 〈S, T, a〉 such that:
S and T are two consistent sets of propositional formulas of Lnac;
a ∈ Lac .
The set of pre-conditions may be empty (S = ∅), which means that the action can be carried out. It is also worth
mentioning that there exists a link between S and T .6 This link is not made explicit in this paper since we are not really
2 Their meaning and their use are different: Lnac will be used for representing beliefs and desires and for building arguments and interactions – see Sections 5
and 6 – and LA will be used for representing a constraint between arguments and restricting the set of the extensions – see Section 7.
3 Note that this notation will not be respected in the motivating example. We prefer to use more explicit strings of lowercase letters.
4 The set S only describes the elements of the world which are mandatory for the execution of the action.
5 For simplicity reasons, actions are encoded in a restricted propositional language.
6 In the sense, that the formulas in T are obtained using the formulas in S.
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interested by the exact definition of actions. We assume that they are given. Note also that a desire d may appear either in
the pre-conditions or in the post-conditions of an action. When d is in the post-conditions of an action, this means that the
action leads to the satisfaction of the desire. When d is in the pre-condition of an action, this means that in order to perform
the action, we should be in a state of the world in which d is already reached. Let us illustrate this notion of action on the
running example.
Example 2 (Continued): In this example, Xac = {dr, hop, ag, afr, gc,w, dt} and the actions that are available for Paula are
the following:
〈{¬fp}, {fp},w〉 〈{¬t}, {t,¬fp}, ag〉
〈{ft}, {lec}, dt〉 〈{¬vac}, {vac}, hop〉
〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t,¬fp}, dr ∧ ag〉 〈{¬vac}, {vac,¬fp}, dr〉
〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t,¬fp}, dr ∧ afr〉 〈{gs}, {vc}, gc〉
〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t,¬fp}, hop ∧ ag〉 〈{¬t}, {t}, afr〉
〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t}, hop ∧ afr〉
Note that the information “If Paula passes to an agency (ag) or goes to a doctor (dr), then she cannot finish her paper”
is directly captured by the post-conditions of the two actions ag and dr. Similarly, the information “If Paula has tickets (t)
and is vaccinated (vac), then she can be in central africa for holidays” is indirecly captured by the post-conditions of the
compound actions hop ∧ afr, hop ∧ ag, dr ∧ afr, and dr ∧ ag.
In the remaining of the paper, we assume that an agent is equipped with the following three finite bases.
Definition 11 (Agent’s bases). An agent is equipped with three finite bases:
(1) Kb ⊆ Lnac containing its basic beliefs about the current state of the world,
(2) Kd containing its desire rules,
(3) Ka containing its actions.
Example 2 (Continued): Paula is equipped with the following bases:
Kb = {gs,¬ch,¬ft,¬vac,¬t,¬fp},
Kd = {〈〉 ↪→ jca, 〈〉 ↪→ fp, 〈〉 ↪→ lec, 〈ch〉 ↪→ vc},
Ka = {
〈{¬fp}, {fp},w〉, 〈{ft}, {lec}, dt〉,
〈{gs}, {vc}, gc〉, 〈{¬t}, {t,¬fp}, ag〉,
〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t,¬fp}, hop ∧ ag〉, 〈{¬t}, {t}, afr〉,
〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t,¬fp}, dr ∧ ag〉, 〈{¬vac}, {vac,¬fp}, dr〉,
〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t,¬fp}, dr ∧ afr〉, 〈{¬vac}, {vac}, hop〉,
〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t}, hop ∧ afr〉}.
From Kd, the set of potential desires of an agent can be identified as follows:
Definition 12 (Potential desires). Let Kb (resp. Kd) be the belief base (resp. the set of desire rules) of an agent. The set of
potential desires of this agent is PD = {dm|∃ 〈b, d1, . . . , dm−1〉 ↪→ dm ∈ Kd and Kb  dm}.
These are “potential” desires because, when the body of the rule is not empty, the agent does not know yet whether the
antecedents (i.e. bodies) of the corresponding rules are true or not. Moreover, throughout the paper, we assume that each
potential desire of an agent is not yet reached in the current state of the world. This assumption is natural as a desire that is
satisfied is no longer a desire.
Example 3. Assume that Paula wants to be rich and, in the current state of the world, Peter is rich. In this case, the desire
“to be rich” does not belong to Paula’s set of potential desires.
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Example 2 (Continued): The set of potential desires of Paula is PD = {jca, fp, lec, vc}.
The following schema gives a synthesis of the presented notions and their representation (from vocabulary to bases).
In the following sections, we propose different kinds of arguments (one for each notion introduced here: belief, desire
and action/plan) and we study the conflicts between these arguments.
5. Typology of arguments
The aim of this section is to present the different kinds of arguments involved in a practical reasoning problem. Three
categories of arguments are distinguished. The first category justifies/attacks beliefs of the knowledge base Kb, while the
two others justify the adoption of the potential desires of the PD. Throughout the paper, arguments will be denoted with
lowercase Greek letters.
5.1. Justifying beliefs
The first category of arguments is that studied in argumentation literature, especially for handling inconsistency in
knowledge bases. Indeed, arguments are built from a knowledge base in order to support or to attack potential conclusions
or inferences. These arguments are called epistemic in [20]. In our application, such arguments are built from the baseKb. In
what follows, we will use the definition proposed in [21].
Definition 13 (Epistemic argument). Let Kb be a beliefs base. An epistemic argument α is a pair α = 〈H, h〉 such that:
(1) H ⊆ Kb and h ∈ Lnac ,
(2) H is consistent,
(3) H  h and
(4) H is minimal (for set⊆) among the sets satisfying conditions 1, 2, 3.
The support of the argument is given by the function Supp(α) = H, whereas its conclusion is returned by Conc(α) = h.
Definition 14 (Set of epistemic arguments). Ab stands for the set of all epistemic arguments that can be built from the baseKb.
Remark: Due to the assumption that each potential desire is not yet true in the current state of the world, it is clear that
the conclusion h of an epistemic argument cannot be a potential desire (i.e. an element of PD). Thus, α ∈ Ab such that
Conc(α) ∈ PD.
Example 2 (Continued): Recall that the knowledge base of Paula is Kb = {gs,¬ch,¬ft,¬vac,¬t,¬fp}. The table below
contains some epistemic arguments of the set Ab. Other arguments, not presented here, can also be built from Kb.
α1 = 〈{gs}, gs〉 α5 = 〈{¬t},¬t〉
α2 = 〈{¬ch},¬ch〉 α6 = 〈{¬fp},¬fp〉
α3 = 〈{¬ft},¬ft〉 α7 = 〈{¬vac ∧ ¬t},¬vac ∧ ¬t〉
α4 = 〈{¬vac},¬vac〉 α8 = 〈{gs,¬ch}, ch → gs〉
… …
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5.2. Justifying desires
A desire may be pursued by an agent only if this desire is justified and feasible. Thus, two kinds of reasons are needed for
adopting a desire:
the conditions underlying the desire hold7 in the current state of world; such reasons will be called explanatory
arguments;
and there is a plan (an action) for reaching the desire; such reasons will be called instrumental arguments.
The definition of the first kind of arguments involves two bases: the belief base Kb and the base of desire rules Kd. In
what follows, we will use a tree-style definition of arguments [22]. This choice is not arbitrary but imposed by the logical
language at hand. In particular, desire rules are not material implications, thus it is important to show how such rules are
chained.
Before presenting that definition, let us first introduce some useful functions that will be used throughout the paper:
Notations: The functionsBeliefs(δ),Desires(δ),Conc(δ) and Sub(δ) return respectively, for a given explanatory argument
δ, the beliefs used in δ, the desires supported by δ, the conclusion and the set of sub-arguments of the argument δ.
Definition 15 (Explanatory argument). LetKb,Kd be two bases. An explanatory argument is a pair δ = 〈S, d〉where d ∈ PD
and S is defined recursively as follows:
If ∃〈〉 ↪→ d ∈ Kd then S is 〈〉 and
Beliefs(δ) = ∅,
Desires(δ) = {d},
Conc(δ) = d,
Sub(δ) = {δ}.
Ifα is an epistemic argument, and δ1, . . . , δm are explanatory arguments, and ∃〈Conc(α), Conc(δ1), . . . , Conc(δm)〉
↪→ d ∈ Kd then S is 〈α, δ1, . . . , δm〉 and
Beliefs(δ) = Supp(α) ∪ Beliefs(δ1) ∪ · · · ∪ Beliefs(δm),
Desires(δ) = Desires(δ1) ∪ · · · ∪ Desires(δm) ∪ {d},
Conc(δ) = d,
Sub(δ) = {α} ∪ Sub(δ1) ∪ · · · ∪ Sub(δm) ∪ {δ}.
Definition 16 (Set of explanatory arguments). Ad stands for the set of all explanatory arguments δ that can be built from Kb
and Kd such that the set Desires(δ) is consistent.8
Example 2 (Continued): Recall that Kb = {gs,¬ch,¬ft,¬vac,¬t,¬fp} and Kd = {〈〉 ↪→ jca, 〈〉 ↪→ fp, 〈〉 ↪→ lec, 〈ch〉 ↪→
vc}. The set Ad = {δ1, δ2, δ3}where:
δ1 = 〈〈〉, jca〉 δ2 = 〈〈〉, fp〉 δ3 = 〈〈〉, lec〉
Note that there is no explanatory argument in favor of desire vc since the pre-condition (ch) of the corresponding desire rule
in not satisfied. Worse yet,¬ch ∈ Kb.
The same desire may be supported by several explanatory arguments since a desire may be the consequent of different
desire rules. The set Desires(δ) of an explanatory argument δ contains the desire d (the conclusion of δ) and, in the case of a
conditional desire, all the desires used for justifying d. The following trivial proposition follows from the previous definitions.
Proposition 3. Let δ ∈ Ad.
The set Desires of δ is a subset of PD (Desires(δ) ⊆ PD).
The set Beliefs of δ is a subset of the knowledge base Kb (Beliefs(δ) ⊆ Kb).
The last category of arguments claims that “a desire may be pursued since it has a plan for achieving it”. The definition of
this kind of arguments involves the belief base Kb, the base of actions/plans Ka, and the set PD.
7 In the sense that the conditions are inferred from the bases of the agent.
8 The fact that the desires of a desire rule are not conflicting is not sufficient to ensure the consistency of the set Desires(δ) of an explanatory argument δ.
Consider, for instance, the following example: Kd = {〈〉 ↪→ d1; 〈〉 ↪→ ¬d1; 〈d1〉 ↪→ d2; 〈¬d1〉 ↪→ d3; 〈d2, d3〉 ↪→ d4}. It is easy to check that only one
explanatory argument, δ, can be built from Kd for the desire d4, and that Desires(δ) contains both d1 and¬d1. Such arguments are forbidden in our system.
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Definition 17 (Instrumental argument). Let Kb,Ka,PD be three bases, and d ∈ PD. An instrumental argument is a pair π =〈〈S, T, x〉, d〉where:
〈S, T, x〉 ∈ Ka,
d ∈ T ,
S ⊆ Kb.
The function Conc will return for an argument π the desire d. Similarly, the functions Plan, PreC and PostC will return
respectively the action 〈S, T, d〉 of the argument, the pre-conditions S of the action, its post-conditions T .
Definition 18 (Set of instrumental arguments). Ap stands for the set of all instrumental arguments that can be built from〈Kb,Ka,PD〉.
The second condition of the above definition ensures that the desire is reached when the action is executed. The third
condition ensures that the pre-conditions of the action hold in the current state of the world. In other words, the action can
be executed. Note that it may be the case that the base Ka contains actions whose pre-conditions are not true. Such actions
cannot be executed and their corresponding instrumental arguments do not exist.
Example 2 (Continued): Let us recall here the three bases of Paula.
Kb = {gs,¬ch,¬ft,¬vac,¬t,¬fp},
Kd = {〈〉 ↪→ jca, 〈〉 ↪→ fp, 〈〉 ↪→ lec, 〈ch〉 ↪→ vc},
Ka = {
〈{¬fp}, {fp},w〉, 〈{ft}, {lec}, dt〉,
〈{gs}, {vc}, gc〉, 〈{¬t}, {t,¬fp}, ag〉,
〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t,¬fp}, hop ∧ ag〉, 〈{¬t}, {t}, afr〉,
〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t,¬fp}, dr ∧ ag〉, 〈{¬vac}, {vac,¬fp}, dr〉,
〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t,¬fp}, dr ∧ afr〉, 〈{¬vac}, {vac}, hop〉,
〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t}, hop ∧ afr〉}.
The only action that allows Paula to be a lecturer consists of defending her thesis (i.e. 〈{ft}, {lec}, dt〉). However, the pre-
condition of this action (ft) is not satisfied in the current state of the world, namely the thesis is not finished yet (¬ ft ∈Kb).
The other desires are all feasible. Their instrumental arguments are gathered in the setAp ={π1, π2, π3, π4, π5, π6}where:
π1 : 〈〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t,¬fp}, dr ∧ ag〉, jca〉
π2 : 〈〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t,¬fp}, dr ∧ af 〉, jca〉
π3 : 〈〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t,¬fp}, hop ∧ ag〉, jca〉
π4 : 〈〈{¬vac,¬t}, {jca, vac, t}, hop ∧ af 〉, jca〉
π5 : 〈〈{¬fp}, {fp},w〉, fp〉
π6 : 〈〈{gs}, {vc}, gc〉, vc〉
Remark: In what follows, A = Ab ∪ Ad ∪ Ap. Note that A is finite since the three initial bases (Kb, Kd and Ka) are finite.
5.3. Summary
The following table summarizes the different arguments involved in a PR problem.
Type of argument Type of its conclusion Set Bases involved
Epistemic Belief Ab Kb
Explanatory desire Ad Kb,Kd
Instrumental desire Ap Kb,Ka,PD
The next section presents the different conflicts between all these arguments.
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6. Interactions between arguments
Arguments built from a knowledge base cannot generally be considered separately in an inference problem. Indeed, an
argument constitutes a reason for believing, or adopting a desire. However, it is not a proof that the belief is true, or in our
case that the desire should be adopted. The reason is that an argument can be attacked by other arguments. In this section,
we will investigate the different kinds of conflicts among the arguments identified in the previous section.
6.1. Conflicts among epistemic arguments
An argument can be attacked by another argument for three main reasons: (i) they have contradictory conclusions
(this is known as rebuttal) [23], (ii) the conclusion of an argument contradicts a premise of another argument (assumption
attack) [23], (iii) the conclusion of an argument contradicts an inference rule used in order to build the other argument
(undercutting) [24].
Since the base Kb contains propositional formulas, it has been shown in [25] that the notion of assumption attack is
sufficient to capture conflicts between epistemic arguments.
Definition 19. Let α1, α2 ∈ Ab. The conflict relationRb on Ab is defined as follows:
α1Rbα2 iff ∃h ∈ Supp(α2) such that Conc(α1) ≡ ¬h.
Example 2 (Continued): In our running example, the base Kb = {gs, ¬ch, ¬ft, ¬vac, ¬t, ¬fp} is clearly consistent. Thus,
epistemic arguments are not conflicting and Rb = ∅.
Let us now consider another knowledge base.
Example 4. Let Kb = {a,¬b, a → b} be a propositional knowledge base. The argument 〈{a,¬b}, a ∧ ¬b〉 attacks in the
sense ofRb the argument 〈{a, a → b}, b〉.
Note that the assumption attack is a binary relation that is not symmetric. Moreover, it can be shown that there are no
self-attacking arguments.
Proposition 4. Let Ab be the set of all epistemic arguments that can be built from a beliefs base Kb. It holds that α ∈ Ab such
that αRbα.
In [26], theargumentationsystem 〈Ab,Rb〉hasbeenapplied forhandling inconsistency inaknowledgebase, sayKb. In this
particular case, a full correspondencehasbeenestablishedbetween the stable extensions of the systemand themaximal con-
sistent subsets of the base Kb. Before presenting formally the result, let us introduce two useful
functions:
Notations:
Let E ⊆ Ab, Base(E) =⋃Hi such that 〈Hi, hi〉 ∈ E .
Let T ⊆ Kb, Arg(T) = {〈Hi, hi〉 is an epistemic argument |Hi ⊆ T}.
Proposition 5 [26]. Let E be a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉.
Base(E) is a maximal (for set inclusion) consistent subset of Kb.
Arg(Base(E)) = E .
Proposition 6 [26]. Let T be a maximal (for set inclusion) consistent subset of Kb.
Arg(T) is a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉.
Base(Arg(T)) = T.
A direct consequence of the above result is that if the base Kb is not reduced to⊥, then the system 〈Ab,Rb〉 has at least
one non-empty stable extension.
Proposition 7. If Kb = ∅ and Kb = {⊥}, then the argumentation system 〈Ab,Rb〉 has non-empty stable extensions.
In addition, it has been shown in [27] that each preferred extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉 returns a consistent subset of Kb.
Proposition 8 [27]. Let E be preferred extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉. It holds that Base(E) is a consistent subset of Kb.
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6.2. Conflicts among explanatory arguments
Two explanatory arguments may also be conflicting, in particular, when they are based on contradictory desires. This
kind of conflict is captured by the following relation:
Definition 20. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ Ad. The conflict relationRd on Ad is defined as follows:
δ1Rdδ2 iff ∃d1 ∈ Desires(δ1), d2 ∈ Desires(δ2) such that d1 ≡ ¬d2.
Proposition 9. The relationRd is symmetric and irreflexive.
Example 2 (Continued): The three explanatory arguments δ1 = 〈〈〉, jca〉, δ2 = 〈〈〉, fp〉 and δ3 = 〈〈〉, lec〉 are not conflicting.
Thus,Rd = ∅.
Let us consider another example in which two explanatory arguments are conflicting.
Example 5. LetKd ={〈〉 ↪→ d1, 〈〉 ↪→¬d1, 〈d1〉 ↪→ d2}. The following three explanatory arguments are built from this base:
δ1 = 〈〈〉, d1〉.
δ2 = 〈〈〉,¬d1〉.
δ3 = 〈〈δ1〉, d2〉.
It is clear that δ2Rdδ3 and δ3Rdδ2 since Desires(δ2) = {¬d1} and Desires(δ3) = {d1, d2}. Similarly, δ1Rdδ2 and δ2Rdδ1
since Desires(δ1) = {d1}
It can also be checked that any two explanatory arguments having conflicting desires are conflicting in the sense of the
relationRd. Formally:
Proposition 10. Let d1, d2 ∈ PD. If d1 ≡ ¬d2, then ∀δ1, δ2 ∈ Ad such that:
(1) ∃δ′1 ∈ Sub(δ1) with Conc(δ′1) = d1, and
(2) ∃δ′2 ∈ Sub(δ2) with Conc(δ′2) = d2,
then δ1Rdδ2.
Note that, from the definition of an explanatory argument δ, the set Desires(δ) cannot be inconsistent. However, the set
Beliefs(δ)may be inconsistent. The union of the beliefs of two explanatory argumentsmay also be inconsistent. Later in the
paper we will show that it is unnecessary to consider these kinds of conflict, since they are captured by conflicts between
explanatory and epistemic arguments (see Propositions 13 and 14).
6.3. Conflicts among instrumental arguments
Two actions (or plans) may be conflicting for three main reasons:
(1) incompatibility of their pre-conditions (indeed, both plans cannot be executed at the same time).
(2) incompatibility of their post-conditions (the execution of both plans will lead to contradictory states of the world).
This captures also the case of two plans leading to contradictory desires.
(3) incompatibility between the post-conditions of a plan and the pre-conditions of the other (this means that the
execution of a plan will prevent the execution of the second plan in the future).
The above reasons are captured in the following definition of attack among instrumental arguments.
Definition 21. Let π1, π2 ∈ Ap and π1 = π2. The conflict relationRp on Ap is defined as follows: π1Rpπ2 iff
PreC(π1) ∧ PreC(π2) | ⊥, or
PostC(π1) ∧ PostC(π2) | ⊥, or
PostC(π1) ∧ PreC(π2) | ⊥ or PreC(π1) ∧ PostC(π2) | ⊥
It is clear from the above definition thatRp is symmetric and irreflexive.9
9 The fact that the post-conditions of a plan are inconsistent with its pre-conditions is not considered as a conflict. In this case, after the execution of the
plan, we must have an update mechanism which will modify the beliefs. It is also for this reason that there is no conflict between epistemic arguments and
instrumental arguments on the post-conditions of a plan (see Definition 22).
Note also that the order in which plans are executed is not considered in this paper. This order may be very important, for instance when we must manage
resources consumed by plans. So, this will be the subject of future work.
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Proposition 11. The relationRp is symmetric and irreflexive.
Example 2 (Continued): Some instrumental arguments are conflicting. These conflicts are summarized in the figure below:
π4 π1 π5 π3
π6 π2
From the above definition, it can be shown that if two plans realize conflicting desires, then their corresponding instrumental
arguments are conflicting too.
Proposition 12. Let d1, d2 ∈ PD. If d1 ≡ ¬d2, then ∀π1, π2 ∈ Ap s.t. Conc(π1) = d1 and Conc(π2) = d2, then π1Rpπ2.
Assumption 1. In this section, we have considered only binary conflicts between plans, and consequently between their
corresponding instrumental arguments. However, in every-day life, one may have for instance three plans such that any
pair of them is not conflicting, but the three together are incompatible. For simplicity reasons, in this paper we suppose
that we do not have such conflicts.
6.4. Conflicts among mixed arguments
In the previous sectionswe have shown how arguments of the same category can interact with each other. In this section,
wewill show that arguments of different categories can also interact. Namely, epistemic arguments play a key role in defining
the status of explanatory and instrumental arguments. An epistemic argument can attack both types of arguments. The basic
idea is to invalidate any belief used in an explanatory argument and any belief used in the pre-conditions of an instrumental
one. The end goal is to ensure that only “warranted” beliefs are used in explanatory and instrumental arguments.
It is worth mentioning that an epistemic argument cannot invalidate a state of the world that is not yet reached like for
instance desires and post-conditions of actions. Indeed, epistemic arguments support beliefs that hold in the current state
of the world. Thus, if they attack a state of the world which is true in the future, they will forbid desires to be reached. Let us
consider the caseof Paulawho thinks that she is not rich andwould like tobe rich. Thus,Kb = {¬rich} andKd = {〈〉 ↪→ rich}.
If the epistemic argument α = 〈{¬rich},¬rich〉 attacks the explanatory argument δ = 〈〈〉, rich〉, then this latter will never
be pursued by Paula even if we can imagine that she has a good plan for it.
Similarly, let us assume that Paula has the following action/plan for reaching her desire: 〈{}, {rich}, x〉. Thus, she has an
instrumental argument π = 〈〈{}, {rich}, x〉, rich〉. If α attacks π , then the plan can never be executed. Consequently, Paula
will not consider her desire as an intention.
Finally, let us note that explanatory arguments and instrumental arguments are not allowed to attack epistemic argu-
ments. In fact, a desire cannot invalidate a belief. Let us illustrate this issue by an example borrowed from [28]. An agent
thinks that it will be raining, and that when it is raining, she gets wet. It is clear that this agent does not desire to be wet
when it is raining. Intuitively, we should get one extension {rain,wet}. The idea is that if the agent believes that it is raining,
and she will get wet if it rains, then she should believe that she will get wet, regardless what she wants. To do otherwise
would be to indulge in wishful thinking.
Definition 22 summarizes all these remarks and gives the exhaustive list of allowed mixed conflicts in our setting.10
Definition 22. Let α ∈ Ab, δ ∈ Ad, π ∈ Ap. The conflict relations between mixed arguments are defined as follows:
αRbdδ iff ∃h ∈ Beliefs(δ) s.t. h ≡ ¬Conc(α).
αRbpπ iff ∃h ∈ PreC(π), s.t. h ≡ ¬Conc(α).
δRpdpπ and πRpdpδ iff Conc(π) ≡ ¬d with d ∈ Desires(δ).11
Example 2 (Continued): In this example, the relations Rbd, Rbp and Rpdp are empty since the beliefs base Kb is consistent
and there is no contradictory desires. The absence of conflict between α6 =〈{¬fp},¬fp〉 and δ2 =〈〈〉, fp〉 illustrates the
previous remarks about the temporal difference between the current state of the world (α6) and the future state of the
world (δ2).
10 Rxy (resp.Rxyx) denotes conflicts (resp. symmetric conflicts) emanating from arguments of Ax towards arguments of Ay .
11 Note that if δ1Rpdpπ2 and there exists δ2 such that Conc(δ2) = Conc(π2) then δ1Rdδ2.
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A trivial consequence of this definition is the following link betweenRb andRbd:
Consequence 1. Let α1, α2 ∈ Ab and δ ∈ Ad such that α1 ∈ Sub(δ). If α2Rbα1 then α2Rbdδ.
Moreover, as already said, the set of beliefs of anexplanatory argumentmaybe inconsistent. In sucha case, theexplanatory
argument is certainly attacked (in the sense ofRbd) by an epistemic argument. Formally:
Proposition 13. Let δ ∈ Ad. If Beliefs(δ)  ⊥, then ∃α ∈ Ab s.t. αRbdδ.
Similarly, when the beliefs of two explanatory arguments are inconsistent, it can be checked that there exist epistemic
arguments that attack the two explanatory arguments.
Proposition 14. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ1)  ⊥ and Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥. If Beliefs(δ1) ∪ Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥, then∃α1, α2 ∈ Ab s.t. α1 Rbdδ1 and α2Rbdδ2.
Conflicts may also exist between an instrumental argument and an explanatory one since the beliefs of the explanatory
argument may be conflicting with the pre-conditions of the instrumental one. Here again, we will show that there exist
epistemic arguments that attack the two arguments. Note that in this case, the set of pre-conditions of the instrumental
argument is not empty.
Proposition 15. Let δ ∈ Ad and π ∈ Ap with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥. If Beliefs(δ) ∪ PreC(π)  ⊥ then ∃α1, α2 ∈ Ab s.t. α1Rbdδ
and α2Rbpπ .
Later in the paper, it will be shown that the three above propositions are sufficient for ignoring these conflicts (between
two explanatory arguments, and between an explanatory argument and an instrumental one).
6.5. Summary of conflict relations between arguments
The following table summarizes the possible conflicts between arguments.
Conflict relation From To Symmetric
Rb Epistemic arg. (Ab) Epistemic arg. No
Rd Explanatory arg. (Ad) Explanatory arg. Yes
Rp Instrumental arg. (Ap) Instrumental arg. Yes
Rbd Epistemic arg. Explanatory arg. No
Rbp Epistemic arg. Instrumental arg. No
Rpdp Instrumental arg. Explanatory arg. Yes
Explanatory arg. Instrumental arg.
Now, all the mandatory pieces are ready for the definition of an argumentation system for practical reasoning.
7. Argumentation system for PR
The notion of constraint forms the backbone of constrained argumentation systems. In a practical reasoning context, it
encodes two important points:
First, it gives the link between the justification of a desire and the plan for achieving it. The basic idea is the following:
as already said, for a desire to be pursued, it should be both justified (i.e. supported by an explanatory argument)
and feasible (i.e. supported by an instrumental argument). Thus, explanatory arguments that are not accompanied
by instrumental arguments for their conclusions will not be considered (see Part 2 of Definition 23). Similarly, in-
strumental arguments that cannot be accompanied by explanatory arguments in favor of their desires will also be
discarded (see Part 1 of Definition 23).
Secondly, it takes into account the recursive form of the explanatory arguments. Indeed, because this particular form,
each explanatory argument must be accompanied by all its subarguments (see Part 3 of Definition 23).
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So, the constraint is formalized as follows:
Definition 23 (Constraint for PR). LetAd andAp be two sets of arguments andLAd∪Ap be the propositional language defined
using Ad ∪ Ap as the set of propositional variables. A constraint for PR is a constraint C on arguments of Ad ∪ Ap such that:
C =
⎛
⎜⎝ ∧
πi∈Ap
⎛
⎜⎝πi →
⎛
⎜⎝ ∨
δj∈{δ∈Ad|Conc(πi)≡Conc(δ)}
δj
⎞
⎟⎠
⎞
⎟⎠
⎞
⎟⎠
∧⎛
⎜⎝ ∧
δk∈Ad
⎛
⎜⎝δk →
⎛
⎜⎝ ∨
πl∈{π∈Ap|Conc(δk)≡Conc(π)}
πl
⎞
⎟⎠
⎞
⎟⎠
⎞
⎟⎠
∧⎛
⎜⎝ ∧
δk∈Ad
⎛
⎜⎝ ∧
β∈Sub(δk)
(δk → β)
⎞
⎟⎠
⎞
⎟⎠
with the convention: (
∨
x∈X x) = ⊥ if X = ∅.
Example 2 (Continued): In the example on Paula, the constraint C is on arguments ofAb ∪Ad ∪Ap. It is defined as follows:
C = ( (π1 → δ1)
∧(π2 → δ1)
∧(π3 → δ1)
∧(π4 → δ1)
∧(π5 → δ2)
∧(π6 → ⊥))
∧( (δ1 → (π1 ∨ π2 ∨ π3 ∨ π4)
∧(δ2 → π5)
∧(δ3 → ⊥))
∧( (δ1 → δ1)
∧(δ2 → δ2)
∧(δ3 → δ3))
Note the particular cases of δ3 and π6: for δ3 (resp. π6) there is no corresponding instrumental (resp. explanatory)
argument.
Example 5 (Continued): In this example, there are three explanatory arguments δ1 = 〈〈〉, d1〉, δ2 = 〈〈〉,¬d1〉 and δ3 =〈〈δ1〉, d2〉. Suppose that there exists only one instrumental argument π = 〈〈S, T, x〉, d2〉. The constraint is thus:
C = ( (π → δ3))
∧( (δ1 → ⊥)
∧(δ2 → ⊥)
∧(δ3 → π)
∧( (δ1 → δ1)
∧(δ2 → δ2)
∧((δ3 → δ1) ∧ (δ3 → δ3)))
1378 L. Amgoud et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 1363–1391
LetA = {δ1, δ2, δ3, π}. The constrained argumentation systemof this example has only oneC-preferred extensionwhich
is the empty set.
A constrained argumentation system for PR is defined as follows:
Definition 24 (Constrained argumentation system for PR). A constrained argumentation system for practical reasoning is the
triple CASPR = 〈A,R, C〉with:
A = Ab ∪ Ad ∪ Ap,
R = Rb ∪ Rd ∪ Rp ∪ Rbd ∪ Rbp ∪ Rpdp,
C a constraint on arguments defined on Ad ∪ Ap as in Definition 23.
Remember that the aim of this paper is to compute the intentions to be pursued by an agent, i.e. the desires that are both
justified and feasible together (this is one of the purposes of a practical reasoning problem). These intentions are defined as
follows:
Definition 25 (Set of intentions). Let Kb,Kd,Ka be three bases and CASPR be the corresponding constrained system. Let
E1, . . . , En be the C-extensions of CASPR under a given semantics.
A set I ⊆ PD is a set of intentions of CASPR under the given semantics iff there exists a C-extension Ei such that for
each d ∈ I , there exists π ∈ Ap ∩ Ei such that d = Conc(π).
Different intention sets may be returned by our CASPR. Indeed, each extension gives birth to a set of intentions, the
state of the world which justifies these intentions and the plans which can realize them. The exact set that an agent decides
to pursue is merely a decision problem as argued in [4]. This choice is beyond the scope of this paper. Recall that the aim of
this paper is only to identify the different possibilities for an agent.
Example 2 (Continued): The constrained argumentation system thatwill help Paula to define her intentions is thusCASPR
= 〈Ab ∪ Ad ∪ Ap,Rp,12 C〉 where C is the constraint defined above.
The system ASPR has two stable and preferred extensions
13 :
E1 = Ab ∪ {δ1, δ2, δ3, π1, π2, π3, π4, π6} and
E2 = Ab ∪ {δ1, δ2, δ3, π4, π5, π6}
Note that the above extensions contain the explanatory argument δ3 in favor of the desire lec even if this desire is not
feasible. Similarly, they contain the instrumental argumentπ6 while the desire vc is not justified. If now,we apply the system
CASPR, then we will get two C-preferred extensions (there is no C-stable extensions in this example):
E ′1 = Ab ∪ {δ1, π1, π2, π3, π4} and
E ′2 = Ab ∪ {δ1, δ2, π4, π5}.
It is worth mentioning that the C-preferred extensions contain only useful information. Thus, the use of the constraint C
makes it possible to remove uninteresting information from the extensions (like δ3 and π6).
Now that the C-extensions are defined, we are able to define Paula’s sets of intentions. She has two sets of intentions
under the preferred semantics:
I1 = {jca}
I2 = {jca, fp}
Our framework does not make choice between these two sets. The choice of the exact set is a decision problem and is
beyond the scope of this paper. For instance, onemay think that since the two desiresmay be satisfied, it is natural to assume
that Paula will choose the second set. Consequently, she should choose the plans π4 and π5. Assume now that Paula is very
cautious, and she does not want to miss her journey to central Africa. In this case, we can easily imagine that she chooses
the set I1 since she has four plans for reaching this desire, and if for any reason one of them fails, she can still satisfy her
desire by another plan.
12 Recall thatRb ,Rd ,Rbd ,Rbp , andRpdp are all empty.
13 Note that thenotionofdefencehas twodifferent semantics inPRcontext.Whenweconsideronlyepistemicorexplanatoryarguments, thedefencecorresponds
exactly to the notion defined in Dung’s argumentation systems and in its constrained extension: an attacked argumentmust be “reinstated” by a defender. Things
are different with instrumental arguments because of the symmetry of the conflict relation. In this case, it would be sufficient to take into account the notion of
conflict-free in order to identify the plans which belong to an admissible set.
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Note: In this example, CASPR does not have C-stable extensions. This means that at least one of the potential desires
of the agent cannot be both justified and feasible, whereas its justification or its feasibility are not attacked in this
state of the world. Here, it is the case for the desire lec (to be a lecturer) and for the desire vc (to have visited her
friend Carla); the first one is justified (argument δ3) but not feasible and the second one is feasible (argument π6) but
not justified. However both δ3 and π6 are not attacked in CASPR, so the justification of lec and the feasibility of vc
are “compatible” with the current state of the world. Stable semantics emphasizes this kind of “compatibility” to the
detriment of the constraint C (desires must be both justified and feasible). So, in these cases, it is natural to consider
that there is no C-stable extensions and the set of intentions remains empty.
With preferred semantics, things are different because the use of set-inclusion maximality allows more flexibility:
even if an argument is not attacked, it can be rejected in order to satisfy the constraint C of the system.
Example 5 (Continued): In this example, we have shown that if A = {δ1, δ2, δ3, π}, then the only C-preferred extension
of the corresponding constrained system is the empty set. Consequently, the empty set is also the unique set of intentions.
Let us now consider a more elaborate version of this example, in particular the one discussed in [9]. Recall that this
version is not handled correctly by existing systems for PR, namely the one proposed in [9].
In the elaborate version, the agent has three potential desires d1, ¬d1 and d2 such that 〈d1〉 ↪→ d2. The explanatory
arguments are gathered in Ad = {δ1, δ2, δ3} with Conc(δ1) = d1, Conc(δ2) = ¬d1, and Conc(δ3) = d2. The relation Rd
is defined as follows: Rd = {(δ1, δ2), (δ2, δ1), (δ2, δ3), (δ3, δ2)}. Assume that there are two instrumental arguments, thus
Ap = {π1, π2} with Conc(π1) = d1 and Conc(π2) = d2. Let us assume that Rp = ∅, Rb = ∅, Rxy = ∅ with x = y, and
Rpdp = {(δ2, π1), (π1, δ2)}. The constraint of the corresponding CASPR is:
C = ( (π1 → δ1) ∧ (π2 → δ3))
∧( (δ1 → π1) ∧ (δ2 → ⊥) ∧ (δ3 → π2))
∧( (δ1 → δ1) ∧ (δ2 → δ2) ∧ ((δ3 → δ1) ∧ (δ3 → δ3)))
It can be checked that the corresponding CAShas oneC-preferred extension E = Ab∪{δ1, δ3, π1, π2}. This agent has thus
one intention set which is I = {d1, d2}. Remind that according to the system proposed in [9], this agent has no intentions
meaning that she will abandon her three desires.
8. Properties of the system
The aim of this section is to study the properties of the proposed argumentation system for PR (CASPR = 〈A,R, C〉). At
some places, we will refer by ASPR to the corresponding basic argumentation system 〈A,R〉 (i.e. the system without the
constraint C).
The first results concern the extensions of the system, and aremainly direct consequences of results obtained in [11]. The
first proposition establishes a link between C-admissible sets and C-preferred extensions, and shows the impact of applying
the constraint on the notion of admissibility.
Proposition 16. Let CASPR = 〈A,R, C〉. Let Ω be the set of C-admissible sets of CASPR.
(1) Let E ∈ Ω . There exists a C-preferred extension E ′ of CASPR s.t. E ⊆ E ′.
(2) Let CASPR
′ = 〈A,R, C′〉 s.t. C′ | C. Let Ω ′ be the set of C′-admissible sets of CASPR′. The inclusion Ω ′ ⊆ Ω
holds.
The two following properties show that the constrained argumentation system is more general than its basic version.
However, the two systems may coincide in some circumstances.
Proposition 17. Let CASPR = 〈A,R, C〉. For each C-preferred extension E of CASPR, there exists a preferred extension E ′ of
ASPR such that E ⊆ E ′.
This proposition is illustrated in the running example. Indeed, E ′1 ⊆ E1 and E ′2 ⊆ E2.
Proposition 18. Let CASPR = 〈A,R, C〉 be such that C is a valid formula on A. Then the preferred extensions of ASPR are
the C-preferred extensions of CASPR.
As already said, due to the constraint C, each C-extension E ofCASPR contains, among the instrumental arguments, only
the ones for which there exists at least one explanatory argument in the same set for their conclusions. Similarly, it contains,
among the explanatory arguments, only the ones for which we can find at least one instrumental argument in favor of their
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conclusions. This means that the constraint makes it possible to filter the content of the extensions and to keep only useful
information. Formally
Consequence 2. Let CASPR = 〈A,R, C〉 and E be its C-extension under preferred or stable semantics.
For all δ ∈ E ∩ Ad, ∃π ∈ E ∩ Ap such that Conc(δ) = Conc(π).
For all π ∈ E ∩ Ap, ∃δ ∈ E ∩ Ad such that Conc(δ) = Conc(π).
Due to the particular constraint used in our system, the empty set is always C-admissible and the system has at least one
C-preferred extension.
Proposition 19
The empty set is a C-admissible of the practical system CASPR.
The practical system CASPR has at least one C-preferred extension.
Recall that ASPR = 〈Ab ∪ Ad ∪ Ap, Rb ∪ Rd ∪ Rp ∪ Rbd ∪ Rbp ∪ Rpdp〉. An important proposition shows that the set
of epistemic arguments in a given stable extension of ASPR is itself a stable extension of the system 〈Ab,Rb〉. Knowing
that the argumentation system 〈Ab,Rb〉 is intended to handle inconsistency in the knowledge baseKb, the following result
shows that stable extensions of ASPR are “complete” w.r.t. epistemic arguments. This means also that explanatory and
instrumental arguments have no impact on the status of beliefs, and that wishful thinking is avoided.
Proposition 20. If E is a stable extension of ASPR, then the set E ∩ Ab is a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉.
We also show that the basic argumentation system ASPR for PR has always stable extensions.
Proposition 21. If Kb = ∅ and Kb = {⊥}, then the system ASPR has at least one non-empty stable extension.
It can be shown that if an explanatory argument belongs to a stable extension ofASPR, then all its sub-arguments belong
to that extension.
Proposition 22. Let E be a stable extension of ASPR. If δ ∈ E ∩ Ad, then Sub(δ) ⊆ E .
Thismeans that the beliefs onwhich this explanatory argument is built are “warranted” and the desires onwhich depend
its conclusion are justified.14
Similarly, we can show that if an instrumental argument belongs to a stable extension then all its pre-conditions are
supported by this extension.
Proposition 23. Let E be a stable extension of ASPR. If π ∈ E ∩ Ap, then PreC(π) ⊆
⋃
αj∈E∩Ab Supp(αj).
In a previous section, we have shown that an explanatory argument may be based on contradictory beliefs. We have also
shown that such an argument is attacked by an epistemic argument. In what follows, we will show that the situation is
worse since such an argument is attacked by each stable extension of the system 〈Ab,Rb〉. That’s why these arguments will
be discarded.
Proposition 24. Let δ ∈ Ad. If Beliefs(δ)  ⊥, then ∀E with E is a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉, ∃α ∈ E such that αRbdδ.
A direct consequence of the above result is that such explanatory argument (with contradictory beliefs) will never belong
to a stable extension of the system ASPR.
Proposition 25. Let δ ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥. Under the stable semantics, the argument δ is rejected in ASPR.
Since an explanatory argument with contradictory beliefs is rejected in ASPR, then it will also be rejected in CASPR.
Proposition 26. Let δ ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥. Under the stable semantics, δ is a rejected argument in CASPR.
Besides in Proposition 14, we have shown that when two explanatory arguments are based on contradictory beliefs, then
the two arguments are attacked by epistemic arguments. Wewill show that they are even attacked by each stable extension
of the system 〈Ab,Rb〉.
14 Note that, in this case, Part 3 of Definition 23 is trivially satisfied. However, it could be not the case under other semantics.
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Proposition 27. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ1)  ⊥ and Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥. If Beliefs(δ1)∪ Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥, then ∀E with
E is a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉, ∃α ∈ E such that αRbdδ1 or αRbdδ2.
We go further, and we show that the two arguments cannot be accepted at the same time, i.e. they cannot belong to the
same stable extension simultaneously. This guarantees that the system proposed here returns safe results (there is no pairs
of explanatory arguments with contradictory beliefs in a C-stable extension).
Proposition 28. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ1)  ⊥ and Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥. If Beliefs(δ1)∪ Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥, then E with
E a C-stable extension of CASPR such that δ1 ∈ E and δ2 ∈ E .
Similarly, some conflicts between explanatory and instrumental arguments were discarded. We have shown in Proposi-
tion 15 that in such a case, the two arguments are attacked by epistemic arguments. Here wewill show that the explanatory
argument cannot be accepted at the same time with the instrumental one. One of them will be for sure rejected in the
system.
Proposition 29. Let δ ∈ Ad and π ∈ Ap with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥. If Beliefs(δ) ∪ PreC(π)  ⊥, then ∀E with E is a stable
extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉, ∃α ∈ E such that αRbdδ, or αRbpπ .
Proposition 30. Let δ ∈ Ad and π ∈ Ap with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥. If Beliefs(δ) ∪ PreC(π)  ⊥ then E with E a C-stable
extension of CASPR such that δ ∈ E and π ∈ E .
The next results are of great importance. They show that the proposed argumentation system for PR satisfies the “con-
sistency” rationality postulate proposed in [13]. Indeed, each C-stable (C-preferred) extension of our system supports a
consistent set of beliefs about the current state of the world. Moreover, the consequences of the plans of each extension are
consistent. In particular, the set of desires is consistent. Thus, each C-stable (C-preferred) extension represents a consistent
state of the world before and after the execution of the corresponding actions.
Notations: The following notations will be used: Let E ⊆ A
Bel(E) =
⎛
⎝ ⋃
αi∈E∩Ab
Supp(αi)
⎞
⎠ ∪
⎛
⎝ ⋃
δj∈E∩Ad
Beliefs(δj)
⎞
⎠ ∪
⎛
⎝ ⋃
πk∈E∩Ap
PreC(πk)
⎞
⎠
Des(E) =
⎛
⎝ ⋃
δj∈E∩Ad
Desires(δj)
⎞
⎠ ∪
⎛
⎝ ⋃
πk∈E∩Ap
Conc(πk)
⎞
⎠
Theorem 1 (Consistency). Let CASPR be a constrained argumentation system for PR, and E1, . . . , En its C-stable extensions.∀Ei , i = 1, . . . , n, it holds that:
(1) The set Bel(Ei) = Bel(Ei ∩ Ab).
(2) The set Bel(Ei) is a maximal (for set inclusion) consistent subset of Kb.
(3) The set
⋃
πk∈Ei∩Ap PosT(πk) is consistent.
(4) The set Des(Ei) is consistent.
Consistency is also ensured with preferred semantics.
Theorem2 (Consistency). LetCASPR be a constrained argumentation system for PR, and E1, . . . , En its C-preferred extensions.∀Ei , i = 1, . . . , n, it holds that:
(1) The set Bel(Ei) is consistent.
(2) The set
⋃
πk∈Ei∩Ap PosT(πk) is consistent.
(3) The set Des(Ei) is consistent.
As direct consequence of the above results, a set of intentions is consistent. Formally:
Theorem 3. Under stable and preferred semantics, each set of intentions of CASPR is consistent.
We have also shown that our system satisfies the rationality postulate concerning the closure of the extensions [13].
Namely, we have shown that the set of arguments that can be built from the beliefs, desires, and plans involved in a given
stable extension, is that extension itself. Before giving this result, let us first introduce some notations:
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Notations: Let E be a C-stable extension of CASPR.
As will denote the set of all (epistemic, explanatory and instrumental) arguments that can be built from Bel(E), Des(E),
the plans involved in building arguments of E and the base Kd.
Theorem 4 (Closure). Let CASPR be a constrained argumentation system for PR, and E1, . . . , En its C-stable extensions. ∀Ei ,
i = 1, . . . , n, it holds that:
Arg(Bel(Ei)) = Ei ∩ Ab.
As = Ei.
In fact, this shows that every “good” argument is included in a C-stable extension. Thus, each desire that deserves to be
pursued will be returned in an intention set.
Note that the property of closure is not satisfied under preferred semantics as shown in the following example:
Example 6. Consider CASPR such that R is empty and there exist two explanatory arguments δ1 = 〈〈〉, d1〉 and δ2 =〈〈δ1〉, d2〉 and only one instrumental argument π1 = 〈〈{}, {d1}, a〉, d1〉. E = Ab ∪ {δ1, π1} is the only one C-preferred
extension of this system.
However, Des(E) = {d1}. So, using Des(E), one can create the argument δ2 (i.e. δ2 ∈ As). In this case, As = E .
However, it is clear that when CASPR is coherent (i.e. its stable extensions coincide with the preferred ones), then it
satisfies closure even under C-preferred semantics.
Property 1. Let CASPR be a constrained argumentation system for PR, and E1, . . . , En its C-preferred extensions. If CASPR is
coherent, then ∀Ei , i = 1, . . . , n, it holds that:
Arg(Bel(Ei)) = Ei ∩ Ab.
As = Ei.
9. Related work
As alreadymentioned in the introduction, a number of attempts have beenmade to use argumentation as a basis for prac-
tical reasoning. These attempts can be divided into two groups of works: works that are interested in identifying argument
schemes that one may encounter in practical reasoning (e.g. [5,6]), and works that propose concrete argumentation-based
systems for PR (e.g. [4,7–10]).
The starting point of Atkinson and Bench Capon in [5] was the following practical syllogism advocated by the philosopher
Walton in [6].
G is a goal/desire for agent X .
Doing action A is sufficient for agent X to carry out G.
Then, agent X ought to do action A.
The above syllogism,whichwould apply to themeans-end reasoning step, is in essence already an argument in favor of doing
action A. However, this does not mean that the action is warranted, since other arguments (called counter-arguments) may
be built or provided against the action. The authors have defined an extended version of this syllogism as well as different
ways of attacking it. However, it is not clear how all these arguments can be put together in order to answer the critical
question of PR “what is the right thing to do in a given situation?”. It is neither clear how these arguments are evaluated,
nor which decision principle is followed in order to choose between competing desires or between competing plans. It is
worth mentioning that most of the schemes and attacks suggested in [5] are already captured in our constrained system.
For instance, to the above syllogism the following critical questions are associated:
(1) Are there alternative ways of realizing G?
(2) Is it possible to do A?
(3) Does the agent have other goals that can be taken into account?
(4) Are there other consequences of doing Awhich should be taken into account?
The first question amounts to find the different instrumental arguments for the desire G and to take all of them into account
in the reasoning, i.e.when computing the set of intentions. The second question amounts to verify whether we are in a state
of the world where A can be executed. In our approach this is captured by the pre-conditions of the plans. The third question
is also captured in our approach. Indeed, we start with the set of all potential desires of the agent, and then we select the
ones that will become its intentions. The last question is captured in our system by the post-conditions of the plans andwith
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the beliefs in the base Kb. Nevertheless, in [5], agent’s preferences (her values) are taken into account while in our system
these are left for investigation.
Regarding the second category of works, it can itself be partitioned into two sub-groups of models: models that are
instantiations of the abstract argumentation framework of Dung [12] (e.g. [29,7,30]), and models that are based on an
encoding of argumentative reasoning in logic programs (e.g. [31]). Our framework builds on the former.
In [29], Amgoud was only interested by the second step of PR process (i.e. generating and checking the feasibility of
plans). She has developed an argumentation framework for generating consistent plans from a given set of desires and
planning rules. Later in [32], she has proposed together with Cayrol an ATMS-based proof theory for that framework. The
framework was then extended with another argumentation framework that generates the desires themselves in [7], taking
thus into account the first step of PR process. For that purpose, a notion of “desire generation rules” has been introduced.
These rules aremeant to generate desires from beliefs. Thus, our desire generation rules aremore general since we allow the
generation of desires not only frombeliefs, but also fromother desires. Another problemwith thework proposed in [7] arises
because desires and beliefs are not correctly distinguished in the antecedent and consequent of the desire generation rules.
This may lead to incorrect inferences where an agent may conclude beliefs on the basis of yet-unachieved desires, hence
exhibiting a form of wishful thinking. Our approach resolves this by distinguishing between beliefs and desires in the rules,
and refining the notion of attack among explanatory arguments accordingly. The problem of the logical language has been
fixed in [9]. In that work, the authors considered three separate systems: one for reasoning about beliefs, one for generating
justified desires, and finally one for generating feasible desires. The three systems are related with each others by attacks.
Indeed, arguments supporting beliefsmay attack both explanatory arguments and instrumental ones. However, explanatory
arguments do not conflict with the instrumental ones. Once the results of the three systems are known, the intentions of an
agent are computed. The main drawback of this approach is the following: it may be the case that two desires, say d1 and
d2, are supported by two conflicting explanatory arguments, however d1 is not feasible since there is no plan for reaching it.
What happens is that the systemmay discard the desire d2 since its explanatory argument is stronger than the one in favor
of d1. However, when computing the set of intentions, d1 will neither be considered since it is not feasible. Thus, we lose
both desires even if it was possible to achieve d2 since it is both justified and feasible. In summary, handling separately the
three types of arguments may lead to undesirable situations.
Hulstijn and van der Torre [30], on the other hand, have a notion of “desire rule,” which contains only desires in the
consequent. But their approach is still problematic. It requires that the selected goals are supported by goal trees15 which
contain both desire rules and belief rules that are deductively consistent. This consistent deductive closure again does not
distinguish between desire literals and belief literals (see Proposition 2 in [30]). This means that one cannot both believe
¬p and desire p. In our framework, on the other hand, the distinction enables us to have an acceptable belief argument for
believing ¬p and, at the same time, an acceptable explanatory argument for desiring p.
In [31], Simari et al. were interested by the first step of a PR process, and have developed an argumentation system for
generating desires. This makes our system more general since it tackles also the second step. Like us, they separate in the
language rules for reasoning about beliefs and rules for reasoning about desires.
In [33], a defeasible logic based on modal logic is used to reason about motivational attitudes (such as obligations,
intentions and desires). In that work, the authors focused on the links between the different attitudes. They show how
to infer information from different (nested) rules describing either the beliefs of an agent, or her obligations, desires and
intentions. However, they do not take into account the feasibility of desires. In this sense, our work is more general.
A last work which is less related to ours is that developed in [34,35]. In these two papers, the authors are interested
in argumentative dialogues/negotiations. Each agent has final goal and a plan for reaching it. The actions of the plan are
arguments that should be uttered. In our paper, we are more interested in generating the final goal(s) of an agent.
10. Conclusion
The paper tackles an important aspect of the practical reasoning problem using argumentation theory. It computes the
set of intentions that an agent mat pursue.
The contribution is twofold. To the best of our knowledge, this paper proposes the first argumentation system that
computes thepossible intentions inone step, i.e.bycombiningdesiregenerationandplanning. This avoidsundesirable results
encountered by previous proposals in the literature. The second contribution consists of studying deeply the properties of
argumentation-based PR.
This work can be extended in different ways:
To improve the language in such a way to take into account temporal aspects.
To relax the assumption that the attack relation among instrumental arguments is binary. Indeed, it may be the case
that more than two plans may be conflicting while each pair of them is compatible.
Another urgent extension would be to introduce preferences to the system. The idea is that beliefs may be pervaded
with uncertainty, desires may not have equal priorities, and plans may have different costs. Thus, taking into account
these preferences will help to refine the intention sets.
15 Similar respectively to our justified desires and our explanatory arguments.
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In [36,37], it has been shown that an argument may not only be attacked by other arguments, but may also be
supported by arguments. It would be interesting to study the impact of such a relation between arguments in the
context of PR.
Another interesting area of future work is investigating the proof theories of this system. The idea is to answer the
question “is a given potential desire a possible intention of the agent?” without computing the whole preferred
extensions.
Finally, we are planning to implement the system. For that purpose, we may take advantage of existing algorithms
developed recently in [38] for generating arguments and counter-arguments.
Appendix A. Proofs of propositions and theorems
Proposition 2. Let CAS = 〈A,R, C〉 and AS = 〈A,R〉 be its basic version. For any α ∈ A, if α is rejected in AS under
semantics x (where x is either preferred or stable), then α is also rejected in CAS under the same semantics x.
Proof. Assume that α ∈ A is rejected in AS under semantics x and not rejected in CAS.
Case of stable semantics: Since α is not rejected in CAS, then there exists E such that E is a C-stable extension of
CAS and α ∈ E . According to Proposition 2.9, E is also a stable extension. Since α is rejected in AS, then α ∈ E ,
contradiction.
Case of preferred semantics: Since α is not rejected in CAS, then there exists E such that E is a C-preferred extension
of CAS and α ∈ E . According to Proposition 2.9, each C-preferred extension is a subset of a preferred extension. This
means that ∃E ′ such E ′ is a preferred extension of AS and E ⊆ E ′. However, since α is rejected in AS, then α ∈ E ′,
contradiction with the fact that α ∈ E . 
Proposition 3. Let δ ∈ Ad.
The set Desires of δ is a subset of PD (Desires(δ) ⊆ PD).
The set Beliefs of δ is a subset of the knowledge base Kb (Beliefs(δ) ⊆ Kb).
Proof. Let δ ∈ Ad.
Let us show that Desires(δ) ⊆ PD. This is a direct consequence from the definition of an explanatory argument and
the definition of the set PD.
Let us show that Beliefs(δ) ⊆ Kb. Beliefs(δ) = ⋃ Supp(αi) with αi ∈ Ab ∩ Sub(δ). According to the definition of
an epistemic argument αi, Supp(αi) ⊆ Kb, thus Beliefs(δ) ⊆ Kb. 
Proposition 4. Let Ab be the set of all epistemic arguments that can be built from a beliefs base Kb. It holds that α ∈ Ab such
that αRbα.
Proof. Let α ∈ Ab. Let us suppose that αRbα. According to Definition 19, ∃h ∈ Supp(α) such that Conc(α) ≡ ¬h.
Moreover, according to the definition of an epistemic argument, it holds that Supp(α)  Conc(α), thus, Supp(α)  ¬h.
Since h ∈ Supp(α), this means that Supp(α)  h,¬h, thus Supp(α)  ⊥. This contradicts the fact that the support of an
epistemic argument (α in our case) should be consistent. 
Proposition 7. If Kb = {⊥} and Kb = ∅, then the argumentation system 〈Ab,Rb〉 has non-empty stable extensions.
Proof. Since Kb = {⊥} and Kb = ∅ then the base Kb has at least one maximal (for set inclusion) consistent subset, say T .
According to Proposition 6, Arg(T) is a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉. 
Proposition 9. The relationRd is symmetric and irreflexive.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Definition 20. 
Proposition 10. Let d1, d2 ∈ PD. If d1 ≡ ¬d2, then ∀δ1, δ2 ∈ Ad such that: (1) ∃δ′1 ∈ Sub(δ1) with Conc(δ′1) = d1, and (2)∃δ′2 ∈ Sub(δ2) with Conc(δ′2) = d2, then δ1Rdδ2.
Proof. Let d1, d2 ∈ PD. Suppose that d1 ≡ ¬d2. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ Ad such that: (1) ∃δ′1 ∈ Sub(δ1) with Conc(δ′1) = d1, and (2)∃δ′2 ∈ Sub(δ2)with Conc(δ′2) = d2. According to the definition of an explanatory argument, it is clear that d1 ∈ Desires(δ1)
and d2 ∈ Desires(δ2). Since d1 ≡ ¬d2 then δ1Rdδ2. 
Proposition 11. The relationRp is symmetric and irreflexive.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Definition 21. 
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Proposition 12. Let d1, d2 ∈ PD. If d1 ≡ ¬d2, then ∀π1, π2 ∈ Ap s.t. Conc(π1) = d1 and Conc(π2) = d2, then π1Rpπ2.
Proof. Let d1, d2 ∈ PD. Suppose that d1 ≡ ¬d2. Let us also suppose that ∃π1, π2 ∈ Ap with Conc(π1) = d1, and Conc(π2)
= d2. According to Definition 17, it holds that d1 ∈ PostC(π1) and d2 ∈ PostC(π2). Since d1 ≡ ¬d2, then PostC(π2) ¬d1. However, the two sets PostC(π1) and PostC(π2) are both consistent (according to Definition 10), thus PostC(π1) ∪
PostC(π2)  ⊥. Consequently, π1Rpπ2. 
Consequence 1. Let α1, α2 ∈ Ab and δ ∈ Ad such that α1 ∈ Sub(δ). If α2Rbα1 then α2Rbdδ.
Proof. By definition, if α1 ∈ Sub(δ) then Supp(α1) ⊆ Beliefs(δ). Moreover, also by definition, if α2Rbα1 then ∃h ∈
Supp(α1) such that Conc(α2) ≡ ¬h. Thus, ∃h ∈ Beliefs(δ) such that Conc(α2) ≡ ¬h. Consequently, α2Rbdδ. 
Proposition 13. Let δ ∈ Ad. If Beliefs(δ)  ⊥, then ∃α ∈ Ab such that αRbdδ.
Proof. Let δ ∈ Ad. Suppose that Beliefs(δ)  ⊥. This means that ∃T that is minimal for set inclusion among subsets of
Beliefs(δ) with T  ⊥. Thus,16 ∃h ∈ T such that T\{h}  ¬h with T\{h} is consistent. Since Beliefs(δ) ⊆ Kb (according
to Proposition 3), then T\{h} ⊆ Kb. Consequently, ∃〈T\{h},¬h〉 ∈ Ab with h ∈ Beliefs(δ). Thus, 〈T\{h},¬h〉Rbdδ. 
Proposition 14. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ1)  ⊥ and Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥. If Beliefs(δ1) ∪ Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥, then∃α1, α2 ∈ Ab s.t. α1 Rbdδ1 and α2Rbdδ2.
Proof. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ1)  ⊥ and Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥. Assume that Beliefs(δ1) ∪ Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥. So,∃T1 ⊆ Beliefs(δ1) and ∃T2 ⊆ Beliefs(δ2) with T1 ∪ T2  ⊥ and T1 ∪ T2 is minimal for set inclusion, i.e. T1 ∪ T2 is
a minimal conflict. Since Beliefs(δ1)  ⊥ and Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥, then T1 = ∅ and T2 = ∅. Thus, ∃h1 ∈ T1 such
that (T1 ∪ T2) \ {h1}  ¬h1. Since T1 ∪ T2 is a minimal conflict, then each subset of T1 ∪ T2 is consistent, thus the set
(T1 ∪ T2) \ {h1} is consistent. Moreover, according to Proposition 3, Beliefs(δ1) ⊆ Kb and Beliefs(δ2) ⊆ Kb. Thus, T1 ⊆ Kb
and T2 ⊆ Kb. It is then clear that (T1 ∪ T2) \ {h1} ⊆ Kb. Consequently 〈(T1 ∪ T2) \ {h1},¬h1〉 is an argument of Ab. Thus,〈(T1 ∪ T2) \ {h1},¬h1〉Rbdδ1. Similar reasoning applies for h2 ∈ T2 (since T2 = ∅). Thus, 〈(T1 ∪ T2) \ {h2},¬h2〉Rbdδ2. 
Proposition 15. Let δ ∈ Ad and π ∈ Ap with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥. If Beliefs(δ) ∪ PreC(π)  ⊥ then ∃α1, α2 ∈ Ab s.t. α1Rbdδ
and α2Rbpπ .
Proof. Let δ ∈ Ad and π ∈ Ap. Suppose that Beliefs(δ)  ⊥. Since Beliefs(δ)  ⊥ and PreC(π)  ⊥, then ∃T1 ⊆
Beliefs(δ) and∃T2 ⊆ PreC(π)with T1 = ∅, T2 = ∅ and T1∪T2 is the smallest inconsistent subset ofBeliefs(δ)∪PreC(π).
Since T1 = ∅, then ∃h1 ∈ T1 such that T1 ∪ T2\{h1}  ¬h1 with T1 ∪ T2\{h1} is consistent. Since Beliefs(δ) ⊆ Kb and
since PreC(π) ⊆ Kb, then T1 ∪ T2 ⊆ Kb. Consequently, T1 ∪ T2\{h1} ⊆ Kb. Thus, 〈T1 ∪ T2\{h1},¬h1〉 ∈ Ab. Moreover,〈T1 ∪ T2\{h1},¬h1〉Rbdδ. Similar reasoning applies for h2 ∈ T2. We build an argument 〈T1 ∪ T2\{h2},¬h2〉Rbpπ . 
Proposition 16. Let CASPR = 〈A,R, C〉. Let Ω be the set of C-admissible sets of CASPR.
(1) Let E ∈ Ω . There exists a C-preferred extension E ′ of CASPR such that E ⊆ E ′.
(2) Let CASPR
′ = 〈A,R, C′〉 such that C′ | C. Let Ω ′ be the set of C′-admissible sets of CASPR′. We have Ω ′ ⊆ Ω .
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Proposition in [11]. 
Proposition 17. Let CASPR = 〈A,R, C〉. For each C-preferred extension E of CASPR, there exists a preferred extension E ′ of
ASPR such that E ⊆ E ′.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Proposition in [11]. 
Proposition 18. Let CASPR = 〈A,R, C〉 such that C is a valid formula on A. Then the preferred extensions of ASPR are the
C-preferred extensions of CASPR.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Proposition in [11]. 
Consequence 2. Let CASPR = 〈A,R, C〉 and E be its C-extension under preferred or stable semantics.
For all δ ∈ E ∩ Ad, ∃π ∈ E ∩ Ap such that Conc(δ) = Conc(π).
For all π ∈ E ∩ Ap, ∃δ ∈ E ∩ Ad such that Conc(δ) = Conc(π).
Proof. These are direct consequences of the constraint C. 
16 Since T is⊆-minimal among inconsistent subsets of Beliefs(δ), each subset of T is consistent; so, ∃T ′ = T \ {h} strictly included in T s.t. T ′  ⊥; so T ′  ¬h
(otherwise, T ′ ∪ {h} = T would be consistent).
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Proposition 19
The empty set is a C-admissible of the practical system CASPR.
The practical system CASPR has at least one C-preferred extension.
Proof. ∅ is admissible (as shown by Dung in [12]) and all πi and δk variables are false in ∅̂, so ∅̂  C) (this is due
to the particular form of the constraint for practical reasoning). Thus, the empty set is C-admissible, consequently, the
argumentation system CASPR has a C-preferred extension. 
Proposition 20. If E is a stable extension of ASPR, then the set E ∩ Ab is a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉.
Proof. Let E be a stable extension ofASPR. Let us suppose that E ′ = E ∩Ab is not a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉. Two cases
exist:
Case 1: E ′ is not conflict-free. This means that there exist α, α′ ∈ E ′ such that αRbα′. Since E ′ = E ∩ Ab, then α, α′ ∈ E .
This means that E is not conflict-free. This contradicts the fact that E is a stable extension.
Case 2: E ′ does not attack every argument that is not in E ′. This means that ∃α ∈ Ab and α ∈ E ′ and E ′ does not attack
(w.r.t. Rb) α. This means that E ′ ∪ {α} is conflict-free, thus E ∪ {α} is also conflict-free, and does not attack an argument
that is not in it (because only an epistemic argument can attack another epistemic argument and all epistemic arguments
of E belong to E ′). This contradicts the fact that E is a stable extension. 
Proposition 21. If Kb = ∅ and Kb = {⊥}, then the system ASPR has at least one non-empty stable extension.
Proof. ASPR can be viewed as the union of 2 argumentation systems:ASb = 〈Ab,Rb〉 andASdp = 〈Ad ∪Ap,Rd ∪Rp ∪
Rpdp〉 plus theRbd ∪ Rbp relation.
Since Kb = ∅ and Kb = {⊥}, then the system ASb has stable extensions (according to Proposition 7). Let E1, . . . , En be
those extensions. The systemASdp is symmetric in the sense of [39] since the relationRd ∪Rp ∪Rpdp is symmetric. In [39],
it has been shown that such a system has stable extensions which correspond to maximal (for⊆) sets of arguments that are
conflict-free. Let E ′1, . . . , E ′m be those extensions.
The two systems are linked withRbd ∪ Rbp. Two cases can be distinguished:
Case 1:Rbd ∪Rbp =∅. ∀Ei, E ′j , the set Ei ∪ E ′j is a stable extension ofASPR. Indeed, Ei ∪ E ′j is conflict-free since Ei, E ′j
are both conflict-free, and the relationRbd ∪Rbp =∅. Moreover, Ei ∪ E ′j attacks every argument that is not in Ei ∪ E ′j ,
since if α /∈ Ei ∪ E ′j , then: i) if α ∈ Ab, then Ei attacks w.r.t. Rbα since Ei is a stable extension. Now, assume that
α ∈ Ad ∪ Ap. Then, E ′j ∪ {α} is conflicting since E ′j is a maximal (for⊆) set that is conflict-free. Thus, E ′j attacks α.
Case 2: Rbd ∪ Rbp = ∅. Let E be a maximal (for set inclusion) set of arguments that is built with the following
algorithm:
(1) E = Ei
(2) while (∃β ∈ Ap ∪ Ad such that E ∪ {β} is conflict-free) do E = E ∪ {β}
This algorithm stops after a finite number of steps (becauseAp∪Ad is a finite set) and gives a set of argumentswhich
is⊆-maximal among the conflict-free sets which include Ei. It is easy to see that E is stable because, by construction,∀γ ∈ (Ap ∪ Ad) \ E , ∃γ ′ ∈ E such that γ ′Rγ , (because if γ ′ ∈ Ab ∩ E it is impossible that γRγ ′ and because if
γ ′ ∈ (Ad ∪ Ap) ∩ E if we have γRγ ′ we also have γ ′Rγ ) and, because Ei ⊆ E , we also have ∀α ∈ Ab \ E , ∃α′ ∈ E
such that α′Rα (because Ei is stable in ASb).
So there is always a stable extension of ASPR. 
Proposition 22. Let E be a stable extension of ASPR. If δ ∈ E ∩ Ad, then Sub(δ) ⊆ E .
Proof. Let E be a stable extension ofASPR. Let δ ∈ Ad. Let us suppose that δ ∈ E and ∃δ′ ∈ Sub(δ) such that δ′ ∈ E . Since
δ′ ∈ E , then ∃x ∈ E such that xRδ′. There are three possible cases:
(1) x ∈ Ab, thus xRbdδ′. This means that ∃h ∈ Beliefs(δ′) such that Conc(x) ≡ ¬h. However, δ′ ∈ Sub(δ), thus
Beliefs(δ′) ⊆ Beliefs(δ). Thus, xRbdδ and consequently, xRδ. This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free.
(2) x ∈ Ad, thus xRdδ′. Thus, ∃d1 ∈ Desires(x) and ∃d2 ∈ Desires(δ′) such that d1 ≡ ¬d2. However, Desires(δ′) ⊆
Desires(δ), thus xRdδ and consequently, xRδ. This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free.
(3) x ∈ Ap, thus xRpdpδ′. This means that Conc(x) ≡ ¬d with d ∈ Desires(δ′). However, Desires(δ′) ⊆ Desires(δ),
thus xRpdpδ and consequently, xRδ. This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free. 
Proposition 23. Let E be a stable extension of ASPR. If π ∈ E ∩ Ap, then PreC(π) ⊆
⋃
αj∈E∩Ab Supp(αj).
Proof. Let E be a stable extension of ASPR, and let π ∈ Ap such that π ∈ E . Let us assume that ∃x ∈ PreC(π) and
x /∈ ⋃αj∈E∩Ab Supp(αj). Let E ′ = E ∩ Ab.
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According to Proposition 20, the set E ′ is a stable extension of the system 〈Ab,Rb〉. Moreover, according to Proposition 5,
Base(E ′) = ⋃αj∈E∩Ab Supp(αj) is amaximal (for set inclusion) consistent subbaseof theknowledgebaseKb. Thus,Base(E ′)∪
{x} is inconsistent. It follows that Base(E ′)  ¬x.
According to Proposition 7, Base(E ′) = ∅. Thus, ∃H ⊆ Base(E ′) such that H = ∅, H is consistent and H  ¬x.
Consequently, 〈H,¬x〉 is an argument of the set Ab, and 〈H,¬x〉 ∈ Arg(Base(E ′)).
According to Proposition 5, Arg(Base(E ′)) = E ′. Thus, 〈H,¬x〉 ∈ E ′. Consequently, 〈H,¬x〉 ∈ E . From Definition 22,
〈H,¬x〉Rbpπ . This means that E is not conflict free. This contradicts the fact that E is a stable extension. 
Proposition 24. Let δ ∈ Ad. If Beliefs(δ)  ⊥, then ∀E with E is a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉, ∃α ∈ E such that αRbdδ.
Proof. Let δ ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥. Let E1, . . . , En be the stable extensions of the system 〈Ab,Rb〉. Suppose that ∃Ei
such that Ei does not attack δ, i.e. α ∈ Ei such that αRbdδ.
According to Proposition 5, Base(Ei) is a maximal (for set inclusion) consistent subset of Kb. Since Beliefs(δ)  ⊥, then∃T ⊆ Beliefs(δ) with T is the smallest inconsistent subset of Beliefs(δ) (i.e. T  ⊥). Moreover, according to Proposition 3,
Beliefs(δ) ⊆ Kb, thus T ⊆ Kb.
Since Base(Ei) is a maximal (for set inclusion) consistent subset of Kb, and T a minimal conflict of Kb, then we have two
cases:
Case 1: Base(Ei) ∩ T = ∅. This means that ∀h ∈ T , Base(Ei) ∪ {h}  ⊥. Thus, Base(Ei)  ¬h. Consequently,∃H ⊆ Base(Ei) with H is minimal for set-inclusion among subsets of Base(Ei) that satisfy H  ¬h. The pair 〈H,¬h〉
is then an argument ofAb. However, according to Proposition 5, Arg(Base(Ei)) = Ei, this means that 〈H,¬h〉 ∈ Ei and〈H,¬h〉Rbdδ.
Case 2: Base(Ei) ∩ T = ∅. Since Base(Ei)  ⊥ and T  ⊥, then ∃h ∈ T and h ∈ Base(Ei) such that Base(Ei)  ¬h
(this is due to the fact that Base(Ei) is a maximal consistent subset of Kb). Consequently, ∃H ⊆ Base(Ei) with H is
minimal for set-inclusion among subsets of Base(Ei) that satisfyH  ¬h. The pair 〈H,¬h〉 is then an argument ofAb.
According to Proposition 5, Arg(Base(Ei)) = Ei, this means that 〈H,¬h〉 ∈ Ei and 〈H,¬h〉Rbdδ. 
Proposition 25. Let δ ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥. Under the stable semantics, the argument δ is rejected in ASPR.
Proof. Let δ ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥.
According to Proposition 21, the system ASPR has at least one stable extension. Let E be one of these stable extensions.
Suppose that δ ∈ E .
According to Proposition 20, the set E ∩ Ab is a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉. Moreover, according to Proposition 24,∃α ∈ E ∩ Ab such that αRbdδ. This contradicts the fact that a stable extension is conflict-free. 
Proposition 26. Let δ ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥. Under the stable semantics, δ is a rejected argument in CASPR.
Proof. Let δ ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥. According to Proposition 25, δ is rejected in ASPR. Moreover, according to
Proposition 2; we know that each argument that is rejected in ASPR is also rejected in CASPR. 
Proposition 27. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ1)  ⊥ and Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥.
If Beliefs(δ1) ∪ Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥, then ∀E with E is a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉, ∃α ∈ E such that αRbdδ1, or αRbdδ2.
Proof. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ1)  ⊥, Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥, Beliefs(δ1) ∪ Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥.
Let E1, . . . En be the stable extensions of the system 〈Ab,Rb〉. Suppose that ∃Ei such that Ei does not attack δ1 and Ei does
not attack δ2, i.e. α ∈ Ei such that αRbdδ1, or αRbdδ2.
Beliefs(δ1) ∪ Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥, so ∃T ⊆ Beliefs(δ1)∪ Beliefs(δ2) with T is the smallest inconsistent subset of
Beliefs(δ1) ∪ Beliefs(δ2) (i.e. T  ⊥).
Moreover, according to Proposition 3, Beliefs(δ1) ⊆ Kb and Beliefs(δ2) ⊆ Kb, thus T ⊆ Kb.
According to Proposition 5, Base(Ei) is a maximal (for set inclusion) consistent subset of Kb. Since Base(Ei) is a maximal
(for set inclusion) consistent subset of Kb, and T a minimal conflict of Kb, then we have two cases:
Case 1: Base(Ei) ∩ T = ∅. This means that ∀h ∈ T , Base(Ei) ∪ {h}  ⊥. Thus, Base(Ei)  ¬h. Consequently,∃H ⊆ Base(Ei) with H is minimal for set-inclusion among subsets of Base(Ei) that satisfy H  ¬h. The pair 〈H,¬h〉
is then an argument of Ab. However, according to Proposition 5, Arg(Base(Ei)) = Ei, this means that 〈H,¬h〉 ∈ Ei.
If h ∈ T ∩ Beliefs(δ1), then 〈H,¬h〉Rbdδ1.
If h ∈ T ∩ Beliefs(δ2), then 〈H,¬h〉Rbdδ2.
Case 2: Base(Ei) ∩ T = ∅. Since Base(Ei)  ⊥ and T  ⊥, then ∃h ∈ T and h ∈ Base(Ei) such that Base(Ei)  ¬h
(this is due to the fact that Base(Ei) is a maximal consistent subset of Kb). Consequently, ∃H ⊆ Base(Ei) with H is
minimal for set-inclusion among subsets of Base(Ei) that satisfy H  ¬h. The pair 〈H,¬h〉 is then an argument of
Ab. According to Proposition 5, Arg(Base(Ei)) = Ei, this means that 〈H,¬h〉 ∈ Ei. If h ∈ T ∩ Beliefs(δ1), then and〈H,¬h〉Rbdδ1. If h ∈ T ∩ Beliefs(δ2), then and 〈H,¬h〉Rbdδ2. 
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Proposition 28. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ1)  ⊥ and Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥.
If Beliefs(δ1) ∪ Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥, then E with E a C-stable extension of CASPR such that δ1 ∈ E and δ2 ∈ E .
Proof. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ Ad with Beliefs(δ1)  ⊥, Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥, Beliefs(δ1) ∪ Beliefs(δ2)  ⊥.
Assume that ∃E with E a C-stable extension of CASPR. According to [11], E is also a stable extension ofASPR. Suppose
that δ1 ∈ E and δ2 ∈ E .
According to Proposition 20, the set E ∩ Ab is a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉. Moreover, according to Proposition 27,∃α ∈ E ∩ Ab such that αRbdδ1, or αRbdδ2. Thus, there is a contradiction, and we can conclude that E with E a stable
extension of ASPR such that δ1 ∈ E and δ2 ∈ E . Thus, we have a contradiction. 
Proposition 29. Let δ ∈ Ad and π ∈ Ap with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥. If Beliefs(δ) ∪ PreC(π)  ⊥ then ∀E with E is a stable
extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉, ∃α ∈ E such that αRbdδ, or αRbpπ .
Proof. Let δ ∈ Ad, π ∈ Ap with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥ and Beliefs(δ)∪ PreC(π)  ⊥. Let us suppose that E is a stable extension
of 〈Ab,Rb〉, and that δ ∈ E and π ∈ E .
Since Beliefs(δ) ∪ PreC(π)  ⊥, Beliefs(δ)  ⊥, and PreC(π)  ⊥, then ∃T1 ⊆ Beliefs(δ) and ∃T2 ⊆ PreC(π) such
that T1 ∪ T2  ⊥ and T1 ∪ T2 is the minimal inconsistent subset of Beliefs(δ)∪ PreC(π). We know also that T1 ⊆ Kb (since
according to Proposition 3, Beliefs(δ) ⊆ Kb) and T2 ⊆ Kb (since PreC(π) ⊆ Kb). Let T = T1 ∪ T2.
According to Proposition 5, Base(E) is a maximal (for set inclusion) consistent subset of Kb. Then, two cases are distin-
guished:
Case 1: Base(E) ∩ T = ∅. This means that ∀h ∈ T , Base(E) ∪ {h}  ⊥. Thus, Base(E)  ¬h. Consequently,
∃H ⊆ Base(E) with H is minimal for set-inclusion among subsets of Base(E) that satisfy H  ¬h. The pair 〈H,¬h〉
is then an argument of Ab. However, according to Proposition 5, Arg(Base(E)) = E , this means that 〈H,¬h〉 ∈ E .
If h ∈ T1, then 〈H,¬h〉Rbdδ.
If h ∈ T2, then 〈H,¬h〉Rbpπ .
Case 2: Base(E) ∩ T = ∅. Since Base(E)  ⊥ and T  ⊥, then ∃h ∈ T and h ∈ Base(E) such that Base(E)  ¬h
(this is due to the fact that Base(E) is a maximal consistent subset of Kb). Consequently, ∃H ⊆ Base(E) with H is
minimal for set-inclusion among subsets of Base(E) that satisfy H  ¬h. The pair 〈H,¬h〉 is then an argument ofAb.
According to Proposition 5,Arg(Base(E)) = E , thismeans that 〈H,¬h〉 ∈ E . If h ∈ T∩Beliefs(δ1), then 〈H,¬h〉Rbdδ1.
If h ∈ T ∩ Beliefs(δ2), then 〈H,¬h〉Rbdδ2. 
Proposition 30. Let δ ∈ Ad and π ∈ Ap with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥. If Beliefs(δ) ∪ PreC(π)  ⊥ then E with E a C-stable
extension of CASPR such that δ ∈ E and π ∈ E .
Proof. Let δ ∈ Ad and π ∈ Ap with Beliefs(δ)  ⊥ and Beliefs(δ) ∪ PreC(π)  ⊥. Let E be a C-stable extension of
CASPR. So, according to [11], E is also a stable extension ofASPR. Let us suppose that δ ∈ E and π ∈ E . Since E is a stable
extension of ASPR, then E ′ = E ∩ Ab is a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉 (according to Proposition 20). Moreover, according
to Proposition 29, since Beliefs(δ)∪ PreC(π)  ⊥ then ∃α ∈ E ′ such that αRbdδ or αRbpπ . This means that E attacks δ or
E attacks π . However, δ ∈ E and π ∈ E . This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free. 
Theorem1. LetCASPR be a constrained argumentation system for PR, and E1, . . . , En its C-stable extensions.∀Ei, i = 1, . . . , n,
it holds that:
(1) The set Bel(Ei) = Bel(Ei ∩ Ab).
(2) The set Bel(Ei) is a maximal (for set inclusion) consistent subset of Kb.
(3) The set
⋃
πk∈Ei∩Ap PosT(πk) is consistent.
(4) The set Des(Ei) is consistent.
Proof. Let Ei be a stable extension of the system CASPR.
(1) Let us show that the set Bel(Ei) = Bel(Ei ∩ Ab).
In order to prove this, one should handle two cases:
Bel(Ei∩Ab) ⊆ Bel(Ei). This is a direct consequence from the fact thatBel(Ei∩Ab)=⋃ Supp(αi)withαi ∈ Ei∩Ab
(cf. definition of Bel(E)).
Bel(Ei) ⊆ Bel(Ei ∩ Ab). Let us suppose that ∃h ∈ Bel(Ei) and h ∈ Bel(Ei ∩ Ab). According to Proposition 20,
Ei ∩ Ab is a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉. Moreover, according to Proposition 5, Bel(Ei ∩ Ab) is a maximal
(for set-⊆) consistent subset of Kb.17 However, Bel(Ei) ⊆ Kb, then h ∈ Kb. Since h ∈ Bel(Ei ∩ Ab), then
Bel(Ei ∩ Ab) ∪ {h}  ⊥ (this is due to the fact that Bel(Ei ∩ Ab) is a maximal (for set-⊆) consistent subset of
Kb). Thus, Bel(Ei ∩ Ab)  ¬h. This means that ∃H ⊆ Bel(Ei ∩ Ab) such that H is the minimal consistent subset
17 Because Bel(Ei ∩ Ab) = ⋃ Supp(αi) with αi ∈ Ei ∩ Ab; so, Bel(Ei ∩ Ab) = Base(Ei ∩ Ab).
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of Bel(Ei ∩Ab), thus H  ¬h. Since H ⊆ Kb (since Bel(Ei ∩Ab) ⊆ Kb), then 〈H,¬h〉 ∈ Ab. However, according
to Proposition 5, Arg(Bel(Ei ∩ Ab)) = Ei ∩ Ab. Besides, h ∈ Bel(Ei), there are three possibilities:
(a) h ∈ Beliefs(δ) with δ ∈ Ei. In this case, 〈H,¬h〉Rbdδ. This contradicts the fact that Ei is a stable extension
that is conflict-free.
(b) h ∈ PreC(π) with π ∈ Ei. In this case, 〈H,¬h〉Rbpπ . This contradicts the fact that Ei is a stable extension
that is conflict-free.
(c) h ∈ Supp(α)with α ∈ Ei. This is impossible since the set Ei ∩Ab is a stable extension, thus it is conflict free.
(2) Let us show that the set Bel(Ei) is a maximal (for set inclusion) consistent subset of Kb.
Since Ei is aC-stable extension ofCASPR, then Ei is also a stable extension ofASPR (according to [11]).Moreover,
according to the first item of Theorem 1, Bel(Ei) = Bel(Ei ∩ Ab). However, according to Proposition 20, Ei ∩ Ab is
a stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉, and according to Proposition 5, Bel(Ei ∩ Ab) is a maximal (for set-⊆) consistent
subset of Kb. Thus, Bel(Ei) is a maximal (for set inclusion) consistent subset of Kb.
(3) Let us show that the set
⋃
πk∈Ei∩Ap PosT(πk) is consistent. Assume that
⋃
πk∈Ei∩Ap PosT(πk) is inconsistent. This
means that ∃π1, . . . , πn ∈ Ei such that PosT(π1) ∪ · · · ∪ PosT(πn) is inconsistent. According to Assumption 1
given in the end of Section 6.3,Rp is binary, and thus, by definition of the relation Rp, it holds that πiRpπj , for all
i, j ∈ 1, . . . , n and i = j. This contradicts the fact that Ei is a C-stable extension, thus conflict-free.
(4) Let us show that the set Des(Ei) is consistent.
Since Ei is a C-stable extension of CASPR, then Ei is also a stable extension of ASPR (according to [11]). Let us
suppose that Des(Ei) is inconsistent, this means that
⋃
Desires(δk) ∪⋃ Conc(πj)  ⊥ with δk ∈ Ei and πj ∈ Ei.
Since Des(Ei) ⊆ PD (according to Proposition 3), then ∃d1, d2 ∈ Des(Ei) such that d1 ≡ ¬d2. Three possible
situations may occur:
(a) ∃π1, π2 ∈ Ei ∩ Ap such that Conc(π1) = d1, and Conc(π2) = d2. This means that π1Rpπ2, thus π1Rπ2. This is
impossible since Ei is a stable extension, thus it is supposed to be conflict-free.
(b) ∃δ1, δ2 ∈ Ei ∩ Ad such that d1 ∈ Desires(δ1) and d2 ∈ Desires(δ2). This means that δ1Rdδ2, thus δ1Rδ2. This
is impossible since Ei is a stable extension, thus it is supposed to be conflict-free.
(c) ∃δ ∈ Ei ∩ Ad, ∃π ∈ Ei ∩ Ap such that d1 ∈ Desires(δ) and d2 = Conc(π).
Since d1 ∈ Desires(δ), thus ∃δ′ ∈ Sub(δ) such that Conc(δ′) = d1. This means that δ′Rpdpπ , thus δ′Rπ .
However, since δ ∈ Ei, thus according to Proposition 22 δ′ ∈ Ei. This is impossible since Ei is a stable extension,
thus it is supposed to be conflict-free. 
Theorem 2. Let CASPR be a constrained argumentation system for PR, and E1, . . . , En its C-preferred extensions. ∀Ei , i =
1, . . . , n, it holds that:
(1) The set Bel(Ei) is consistent.
(2) The set
⋃
πk∈Ei∩Ap PosT(πk) is consistent.
(3) The set Des(Ei) is consistent.
Proof. Let CASPR be a constrained argumentation system for PR.
(1) Let E be a preferred extension ofASPR. Assume that Bel(E) is inconsistent. Thus, there exists C ⊆ Bel(E) s.t. C is
a minimal (for set inclusion) subset of Bel(E) that is inconsistent. Since C  ⊥, there exists h ∈ C s.t. C \ {h}  ¬h.
Since C is minimal, thus H ⊂ C \ {h} s.t. H  ¬h. Moreover, Bel(E) ⊆ Kb, thus C \ {h} ⊆ Kb. Consequently,〈C \ {h},¬h〉 ∈ Ab and there exists y ∈ E such that:
(a) either y = δ ⊆ E ∩ Ad and h ∈ Beliefs(δ). Thus, 〈C \ {h},¬h〉Rbd δ.
(b) or y = π ⊆ E ∩ Ap and h ∈ PreC(π). Thus, 〈C \ {h},¬h〉Rbp π .
(c) or y = α ⊆ E ∩ Ap and h ∈ Supp(α). Thus, 〈C \ {h},¬h〉Rb α.
In each situation (y = δ, y = π , y = α), since y ∈ E , then ∃α′ ∈ E ∩ Ab which attacks the attacker of y, so
s.t. α′ Rb〈C \ {h},¬h〉. This means that ∃h′ ∈ C \ {h} s.t. Conc(α′) = ¬h′. However, since h′ ∈ C \ {h} which is
included in Bel(E), then ∃x ∈ E s.t:
(a) x ∈ Ab and h′ ∈ Supp(x). Thus, α′Rbx. This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free.
(b) x ∈ Ad and h′ ∈ Beliefs(x). Thus, α′Rbdx. This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free.
(c) x ∈ Ap and h′ ∈ PreC(x). Thus, α′Rbpx. This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free.
Since for each preferred extension E of ASPR, Bel(E) is consistent, then each C-preferred extension E ′, Bel(E ′)
is consistent as well since E ′ is a subset of a preferred extension E . Thus, Bel(E ′) ⊆ Bel(E).
(2) Let E be a C-preferred extension of CASPR. Assume that
⋃
πk∈E∩Ap PosT(πk) is inconsistent. Thus, there exists
C ⊆ ⋃πk∈E∩Ap PosT(πk) s.t. C is minimal (for set inclusion) and inconsistent. According to Assumption 1 given
in Section 6.3 and Definition 10, C = C1 ∪ C2 with C1, C2 = ∅ and ∃π1, π2 ∈ E ∩ Ap s.t. C1 ⊆ PosT(π1) and
C2 ⊆ PosT(π2). Thus, π1Rpπ2 (and π2Rpπ1). This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free.
(3) Let E be a C-preferred extension of CASPR. Assume that Des(E) is inconsistent. Thus, ∃d1, d2 ∈ Des(E) s.t.
d1 ≡ ¬d2. There are three cases:
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(a) d1 ∈ Desires(δ1) and d2 ∈ Desires(δ2) with δ1, δ2 ∈ Ad ∩ E . This means that δ1Rdδ2 and δ2Rdδ1. This
contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free.
(b) d1 ∈ Desires(δ) and d2 ∈ Conc(π)with δ ∈ Ad ∩ E and π ∈ Ap ∩ E . This means that δRdpπ . This contradicts
the fact that E is conflict-free.
(c) d1 ∈ Conc(π1) and d2 ∈ Conc(π2) with π1, π2 ∈ Ap ∩ E . This means that π1Rpπ2. This contradicts the fact
that E is conflict-free. 
Theorem 3. Under the stable and preferred semantics, each set of intentions of CASPR is consistent.
Proof. Let I be a set of intentions ofCASPR. Let us suppose that I is inconsistent. From the definition of an intention set, it
is clear that I ⊆ Des(Ei)with Ei is an extension ofCASPR. However, according to Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 the setDes(Ei)
is consistent. 
Theorem 4. Let CASPR be a constrained argumentation system for PR, and E1, …, En its C-stable extensions. ∀Ei , i = 1, . . . , n,
it holds that:
(1) The set Arg(Bel(Ei)) = Ei ∩ Ab.
(2) As = Ei.
Proof. Let Ei be a C-stable extension of the system CASPR. Ei is also a stable extension of ASPR (according to [11]).
(1) Let us show that Arg(Bel(Ei)) = Ei ∩ Ab.
According to Theorem 1, it is clear that Bel(Ei) = Bel(Ei ∩Ab). Moreover, according to Proposition 20, Ei ∩Ab is a
stable extension of 〈Ab,Rb〉. Besides, according to Proposition 5, Arg(Bel(Ei ∩ Ab)) = Ei ∩ Ab, thus Arg(Bel(Ei))
= Ei ∩ Ab.
(2) Let us show that As = Ei.
Ei ⊆ As: This is trivial.
As⊆ Ei: Let us suppose that ∃y ∈ As and y /∈ Ei. There are three possible situations:
(a) y ∈ As ∩Ab: Since y /∈ Ei, this means that ∃α ∈ Ei ∩ Ab such that αRby. Thus, Supp(α) ∪ Supp(y)  ⊥.
However, Supp(α) ⊆ Bel(Ei) and Supp(y) ⊆ Bel(Ei), thus Supp(α) ∪ Supp(y) ⊆ Bel(Ei). This means that
Bel(Ei) is inconsistent. According to Theorem 1 this is impossible.
(b) y ∈ As ∩Ad: Since y /∈ Ei, this means that ∃x ∈ Ei such that xRy. There are three situations:
Case 1: x ∈ Ab Thismeans that Beliefs(y)∪Supp(x)  ⊥. However, Beliefs(y)∪Supp(x)⊆ Bel(Ei). Thus,
Bel(Ei) is inconsistent. This contradicts Theorem 1.
Case 2: x ∈ Ad Thismeans thatDesires(y)∪Desires(x)  ⊥. However,Desires(y)∪Desires(x)⊆ Des(Ei).
So, Des(Ei) is inconsistent. This contradicts Theorem 1.
Case 3: x ∈ Ap This means that Desires(y) ∪ Conc(x)  ⊥. However, Desires(y) ∪ Conc(x) ⊆ Des(Ei).
Thus, Des(Ei) is inconsistent. This contradicts Theorem 1.
(c) y ∈ As ∩Ap: Since y /∈ Ei, this means that ∃x ∈ Ei such that xRy. There are three situations:
Case 1: x ∈ Ab Thismeans thatxRbpy, thusSupp(x)∪PreC(y)  ⊥.However,SUPP(x)∪PreC(y) ⊆ Bel(Ei).
Thus, Bel(Ei) is inconsistent. This contradicts Theorem 1.
Case 2: x ∈ Ad This means that xRpdpy, so we have Desires(x) ∪ Conc(y)  ⊥. However, Desires(x) ∪
Conc(y) ⊆ Des(Ei). Thus, Des(Ei) is inconsistent. This contradicts Theorem 1.
Case 3: x ∈ Ap This means that xRpy. There are three different cases:
PreC(x) ∪ PreC(y)  ⊥.
However, PreC(x)∪ PreC(y) ⊆ Bel(Ei). Thus, Bel(Ei) is inconsistent. This contradicts Theorem 1.
PostC(x) ∪ PreC(y)  ⊥. We know that y is built using one of the plans of Ei, say p = 〈S, T, a〉.
Thus, ∃π ∈ Ei such that π = 〈p, d〉. Thus, PostC(x) ∪ PreC(π)  ⊥, consequently, xRπ . This is
impossible since Ei is a stable extension, thus it is supposed to be conflict-free.
PostC(x)∪PostC(y)  ⊥. Sincey ∈ As, thusy is built usingoneof theplansofEi, sayp = 〈S, T, a〉.
Thus, ∃π ∈ Ei such that π = 〈p, d〉. Thus, PostC(x) ∪ PostC(π)  ⊥, consequently, xRπ . This is
impossible since Ei is a stable extension, thus it is supposed to be conflict-free. 
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